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Home > Archive > Anonymous Servers > January 2006 > Question about adequate security measures for email
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Question about adequate security measures for email
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| Anonymous 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| I am a very light user of the remailer network, about 10 messages a
month. My security needs are extreem, i.e. life or death or prision
forever. I currently use a chain of 20 remailers with stunnel
ephemeral keys through Tor. Is that adequate for a life or death
situation dealing with a TLA.
My concern is the appearence of new remailers of unknown reputation
or origon; should I increase to a chain of 25?
Thanks.
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| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
["Followup-To:" header set to alt.privacy.anon-server.]
On Tue, 10 Jan 2006 15:26:54 +0000 (GMT), Anonymous wrote in
Message-Id: <6b18dcba54526b600a31509088f181d0@anon.bananasplit.info>:
> I am a very light user of the remailer network, about 10 messages a
> month. My security needs are extreem, i.e. life or death or prision
> forever. I currently use a chain of 20 remailers with stunnel
> ephemeral keys through Tor. Is that adequate for a life or death
> situation dealing with a TLA.
>
> My concern is the appearence of new remailers of unknown reputation
> or origon; should I increase to a chain of 25?
20 remailers is the maximum the system supports. This is because the
size of the Mixmaster message is fixed, regardless of the content.
Padding is used to bring all messages up to the same size. With 20
remailers, your headers include little or no padding.
With chain lengths like that, you don't really need to worry about new
nodes and their reputations. You only need 2 good-guys adjacent to each
other in the chain and your anonymity is secured.
If you want to be really really paranoid, you might want to hardcode
two adjacent nodes somewhere in your chain. Those should be nodes you
trust and they should use Ephemeral TLS between them. This ensures that
the message could never be compromised at a later time, even if all the
remailer keys were captured. Not a likely event, but hey. :-)
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--
pub 1024D/8ED57743 2003-07-08 Bananasplit Operator
Key fingerprint = 796F 67E0 E890 A0BB BDAE EBB4 94A6 7A09 8ED5 7743
uid Admin <admin.bananasplit.info>
| |
| Ari Silverstein 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| On Tue, 10 Jan 2006 15:26:54 +0000 (GMT), Anonymous wrote:
> I am a very light user of the remailer network, about 10 messages a
> month. My security needs are extreem, i.e. life or death or prision
> forever. I currently use a chain of 20 remailers with stunnel
> ephemeral keys through Tor. Is that adequate for a life or death
> situation dealing with a TLA.
>
> My concern is the appearence of new remailers of unknown reputation
> or origon; should I increase to a chain of 25?
>
> Thanks.
Do you trust ppl you don't know? Anyone of them could, and probably are,
compromised or owned by a TLA of some country.
--
Drop the alphabet for email
| |
| George Orwell 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| On Tue, 10 Jan 2006 15:26:54 +0000, Anonymous wrote:
> I am a very light user of the remailer network, about 10 messages a
> month. My security needs are extreem, i.e. life or death or prision
> forever. I currently use a chain of 20 remailers with stunnel ephemeral
> keys through Tor. Is that adequate for a life or death situation dealing
> with a TLA.
I don't know, but am curious as to what percentage of your messages get
through.
>
> My concern is the appearence of new remailers of unknown reputation
> or origon; should I increase to a chain of 25?
I would go for 40 if you have had a high percentage get through with 20.
>
> Thanks.
| |
| Troy McClure 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| Ari Silverstein wrote:
> On Tue, 10 Jan 2006 15:26:54 +0000 (GMT), Anonymous wrote:
>
>
> Do you trust ppl you don't know? Anyone of them could, and probably are,
> compromised or owned by a TLA of some country.
> --
> Drop the alphabet for email
It kind of makes you wonder how many Tor servers are run by TLA;
especially since (for now, at least) you cannot have more than 3 nodes in
a chain, it is low latency, and there's no padding.
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| In article < 2fb87539938a30107b449e139795b86c@mixmast
er.it>
George Orwell <nobody@mixmaster.it> wrote:
>
> I would go for 40 if you have had a high percentage get through with 20.
Eelbash, after running a remailer for 6 years, you should know
that the maximum chain length is 20 remailers. You can't go
higher.
| |
| Anonymous 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| George Orwell <nobody@mixmaster.it> wrote:
>
> I don't know, but am curious as to what percentage of your messages get
> through.
If I avoid the remailer Eelbash, then all of my messages go through
with 20 remailers just fine. It does take a while to arrive though,
because of all the latency.
| |
| George Orwell 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| Xref: number1.nntp.dca.giganews.com alt.privacy.anon-server:430195
On Tue, 10 Jan 2006 21:27:47 +0000, Anonymous wrote:
> George Orwell <nobody@mixmaster.it> wrote:
>
> If I avoid the remailer Eelbash, then all of my messages go through with
> 20 remailers just fine. It does take a while to arrive though, because of
> all the latency.
If you have been having trouble getting messages through when including
Eelbash in the chain, it's not surprising, since that remailer is no
longer in operation.
| |
| Anonymous 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| George Orwell <nobody@mixmaster.it> wrote:
>
>
> If you have been having trouble getting messages through when including
> Eelbash in the chain, it's not surprising, since that remailer is no
> longer in operation.
When Eelbash was up, shit for brains.
| |
| Ari Silverstein 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| On Tue, 10 Jan 2006 14:51:27 -0500 (EST), Troy McClure wrote:
>
> It kind of makes you wonder how many Tor servers are run by TLA;
> especially since (for now, at least) you cannot have more than 3 nodes in
> a chain, it is low latency, and there's no padding.
Well, it was an Office Of Naval Intel project.
--
Drop the alphabet for email
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| nemo_outis 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| Ari Silverstein <abcarisilversteinn@yahoo.comxyz> wrote in
news:wgn0orot84fv$.1rqqsdo8eslix.dlg@40tude.net:
> On Tue, 10 Jan 2006 14:51:27 -0500 (EST), Troy McClure wrote:
>
>
> Well, it was an Office Of Naval Intel project.
And the entire internet was originally a Department of Defense project
(ARPA). So what's your point?
Regards,
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| nemo_outis wrote:
>
> And the entire internet was originally a Department of Defense project
> (ARPA). So what's your point?
That he can lob firecrackers...
| |
| Thrasher Remailer 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| In <Xns97485D79A64BAabcxyzcom@127.0.0.1>, abc@xyz.com wrote:
>Ari Silverstein <abcarisilversteinn@yahoo.comxyz> wrote in
>news:wgn0orot84fv$.1rqqsdo8eslix.dlg@40tude.net:
>
>
>
>And the entire internet was originally a Department of Defense project
>(ARPA). So what's your point?
>
>Regards,
SHUT UP EELBASH!
| |
| Ari Silverstein 2006-01-13, 9:21 pm |
| On 11 Jan 2006 16:11:24 GMT, nemo_outis wrote:
>
> And the entire internet was originally a Department of Defense project
> (ARPA). So what's your point?
Your head.
--
Drop the alphabet for email
| |
| Thrasher Remailer 2006-01-15, 5:47 pm |
| In article <dq0kp4$bp7$1@bananasplit.info>
Zax <fleegle@bananasplit.info> wrote:
>
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
> ["Followup-To:" header set to alt.privacy.anon-server.]
> On Tue, 10 Jan 2006 15:26:54 +0000 (GMT), Anonymous wrote in
> Message-Id:
<6b18dcba54526b600a31509088f181d0@anon.bananasplit.info>:
>
messages a[vbcol=seagreen]
prision[vbcol=seagreen]
reputation[vbcol=seagreen]
>
> 20 remailers is the maximum the system supports. This is because
the
> size of the Mixmaster message is fixed, regardless of the content.
> Padding is used to bring all messages up to the same size. With 20
> remailers, your headers include little or no padding.
>
> With chain lengths like that, you don't really need to worry about
new
> nodes and their reputations. You only need 2 good-guys adjacent to
each
> other in the chain and your anonymity is secured.
>
> If you want to be really really paranoid, you might want to hardcode
> two adjacent nodes somewhere in your chain. Those should be nodes
you
> trust and they should use Ephemeral TLS between them.
Ok, that sounds good, but how do i determine or ascertain whether
two remailers use tls ephemeral keys between them? Are there any,
and how do i find this out?
| |
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| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
On 15 Jan 2006 23:12:10 -0000, Thrasher Remailer wrote in
Message-Id: <QNPKZQHL38733.3001157407@reece.net.au>:
> Ok, that sounds good, but how do i determine or ascertain whether
> two remailers use tls ephemeral keys between them? Are there any,
> and how do i find this out?
Check out:
http://www.noreply.org/tls/
Try and select remailers that have a preferred cipher of:
DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
or
EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
Put two of these next to each other in your chain and they will
communicate using Ephemeral DH.
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--
pub 1024D/8ED57743 2003-07-08 Bananasplit Operator
Key fingerprint = 796F 67E0 E890 A0BB BDAE EBB4 94A6 7A09 8ED5 7743
uid Admin <admin.bananasplit.info>
| |
| Anonymous 2006-01-15, 8:46 pm |
|
On 15 Jan 2006 23:26:25 +0000 (UTC), Zax <fleegle@bananasplit.info> wrote:
>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
>Hash: SHA512
>
>On 15 Jan 2006 23:12:10 -0000, Thrasher Remailer wrote in
>Message-Id: <QNPKZQHL38733.3001157407@reece.net.au>:
>
>
>Check out:
>http://www.noreply.org/tls/
>
>Try and select remailers that have a preferred cipher of:
>DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA
>or
>EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA
>
>Put two of these next to each other in your chain and they will
>communicate using Ephemeral DH.
>
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>
>--
>pub 1024D/8ED57743 2003-07-08 Bananasplit Operator
> Key fingerprint = 796F 67E0 E890 A0BB BDAE EBB4 94A6 7A09 8ED5 7743
>uid Admin <admin.bananasplit.info>
>
TLS can provide authentication (identification of the communication
partner), privacy/confidentiality (communication is not intercepted or
eavesdropped), and integrity (message has not been modified).
Current remailer implementations of TLS offer some eavesdropping
protection, but amigo, anon, banana, cripto, daat, dingo, dizum, frell,
george, metacolo, panta, paranoia, randseed, tonga, and vger (sorry if
I missed any) do not provide any authentication because their domain
certificates are typically self-signed. Accordingly, their TLS
communications are still subject to man-in-the-middle attacks for
eavesdropping and/or possible message modification.
This was understandable when it was necessary to pay usury rates to
Verisign, Entrust, RSA, et. al. for a signed domain cert; however,
CAcert.org offers free domain certs. This is a recent development
and cost is no longer an issue.
I would respectfully suggest that everyone implement TLS and get
your domain cert signed by Thawte, CAcert, or both. This would make
man-in-the-middle attacks on remailer communications much more difficult.
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