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Anonymous Anonymity - Request For Comments
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| Gandalf The White 2005-07-05, 2:46 am |
| Greetings and Salutations:
On The Internet - July 4, 2005
A Declaration of Anonymity
Anonymous Anonymity - Request For Comments
"I think paranoia can be instructive in the right doses. Paranoia is a
skill." - John Shirley
I would like to first ask the community to read this and comment on the
"Issues" section. I am struggling with the how to fix the issues
presented, specifically the first issue. It is a puzzle that I am
having a hard time solving. Any suggestions would be appreciated. If
there is a solution that is already well known, please tell me. Thanks.
Table Of Contents:
1) Abstract
2) High Level Description
3) Description
4) Issues
Abstract:
The current state of anonymous proxies do not provide adequate
protection for the entity wishing to preserve their anonymity.
Anonymous remailers and their ISP's have had court orders to have their
logs subpoenaed in court (i). There is also a "trust" that the
anonymous proxy is truly anonymous.
Given that Country "C" restricts access to certain sites on "The
Internet" located in country "A". Also given that country "C" wishes to
gain knowledge of which of its citizens are trying to access restricted
sites, country "C" could set up anonymous proxies in country "N" to
monitor its own citizens. In addition if country "C" wished to monitor
already popular anonymous sites for traffic, they could install a
employee in the offices of the ISP that serves the popular anonymous
site and have that employee surreptitiously monitor the traffic going to
/ leaving that site.
Proposed is a truly anonymous system wherein no one entity has a
complete picture of the transaction. This system can be installed on a
corporate LAN (Local Area Network) to allow anonymous access of
"sensitive" data (Example Anonymous employee suggestions, Human
Resources "sensitive" procedures / documentation (medical forms,
complaint procedures)) or it can be installed on "The Internet".
I have seen the statement "Information Wants to Be Free". I would
revise that statement to "Information Will Be Free". The information
does not care one way or the other. But humans, simply by their
curiosity and need to explore ideas will make the information free.
High Level Description:
The software will facilitate the transfer of files (HTTP, FTP, etc.)
between two computers using anonymous proxies. Every machine will have
"the least" amount of knowledge to make the transfer possible. One
computer (the end point) will have access to the data and will know the
intermediary proxy but will not know what computer the file is
ultimately destined for. Another computer (the intermediary server or
the intermediary proxy) will know what two computers the file is being
transferred between but will not know the contents of the file. The
last computer (The destination / anonymous machine) will know what the
file is and who the proxy is, but not where the file is coming from.
When the software is launched, it decides how much bandwidth is
available for the connection. If it is a low bandwidth then the machine
will perform the services of an Intermediate Proxy or End Point. If
high bandwidth then the machine can perform as a Intermediary Server and
/ or as a Intermediary Proxy. This information is only known by the
machine that runs the software, it is not told to any other computer.
This way nobody know if a computer is a server or just a transfer agent.
Connections are made to other computers, requests are sent out for
additional connections until "enough" (depending on bandwidth)
connections are made.
Searches are passed to all connected machines. If the operator makes a
selection then that data is transferred to the machine. Searches are
performed via full URI Scheme (ii) request, by words or phrases
contained in the file or by filename (or parts thereof). Files
retrieved (either from "The Internet" or from another machine) are saved
in cache on each machine. When the file cache is full, the files that
haven't been accessed for the longest time are deleted. This allows for
a "shadow" Internet, sites that are censored or deleted are still
available via the Anonymous Anonymity network.
Detailed Description:
There are up to five devices involved in each transaction.
1) Destination Machine - The machine that wishes to remain anonymous
2) Intermediary Server.
3) Intermediary Proxy.
4) End point - HTTP anonymous Proxy or file server
5) The (HTTP, FTP, NNTP, etc) server that the Anonymous Machine wishes
to reach.
With this anonymous network, as with the original design of "The
Internet", there is no central server. The software is initiated on the
users machine. The bandwidth is detected:
1) "Low Bandwidth" - Less than 512 kilobits / second the machine
establishes itself mainly as a Intermediary Proxy / End Point.
2) "High Bandwidth" - Greater than 512 kilobits per second and TCP port
80 inbound allowed, the machine establishes itself mainly as a
Intermediary Server.
All connections / communications will use the HTTPEncode encoding.
HTTPEncode uses the same idea as UUEncode with a slight difference.
Whereas UUEncode takes binary data and encodes it into "plain text",
HTTPEncode takes that binary data one step further. The binary data is
not only encoded to ASCII characters, the HTTPEncode will create HTTP
wrappers that add HTTP tags to the beginning and end of the data, and
throw in random HTML tags inside the data. The encoding will also
redistribute the character count so that the end product has
approximately the same character distribution as "normal" HTML pages.
This is to avoid transport layer --> application layer firewalls that
look for tunneling over port 80.
When the software is installed the user is asked if they have any
filtering software that blocks what sites they are able to go to /
monitors what sites they go to. If they do then their machine is not
allowed to be an end point that fetches "fresh" web pages. Any firewall
devices will have to be set up to allow inbound port 80 (or port "X",
user defined (since some ISP's block port 80)) connections. If this
cannot be done then this machine is primarily a outbound / Intermediary
Proxy connect machine.
The software then attempts connection to a Intermediary Server. The IP
address of an initial intermediary server can be entered manually or
downloaded from a web site. Intermediary servers should have port 80
open as an inbound connection so that they appear to be another web
server. If the machine has determined that it has the capabilities to
be a Intermediary Server then it should allow connections to itself as a
Intermediary Server. The machine should also search for other
Intermediary Servers so that requests are distributed between many
servers. Note: If inbound port 80 cannot be established then that
machine can still act as a server by making the port 80 outbound
connection when asked to to another machine (see next paragraph handing
off to another server). Obviously when the port 80 outbound connection
is made two way communications can then ensue.
If a server has too many nodes, it should pass any new connections off
to another server and notify the machine that is trying to connect of
this handoff so that it can establish a direct connection to the other
server. If an Intermediary Proxy is using more than 50% of its
bandwidth proxying connections, then additional connection requests
should be denied.
The machine then creates a Node ID by picking a random number. The Node
ID should only be used for communication between two specific computes,
if another connection is required another Node ID should be created.
Routes will be placed in a Node ID and IP Address table as the
"connections" (IP address connection, as opposed to a interface, like
routers do) so that data can be routed to a directly connected Node ID.
Routing - Since random Node IDs are chosen, this routing protocol would
not allow summarization of addresses. Just individual direct
connections will be in the routing table (Node ID/ real IP pairs). Data
would be "routed" by each node keeping a table of incoming Node ID /
search requests paired with outgoing Node ID / search requests. The
route back being (of course) the path of pairs of Node ID's and search
requests that are related. This gives each node the "least knowledge"
of the source and destination. An Intermediary Server should not know
whether a node that is connected is another Intermediary Server or a
Anonymous Machine or an End Point.
All connections / communications should be encrypted with the exception
of the request. Each connection creates a unique encryption
public/private key pair for use in communication (this is so that the
user cannot be identified by using the same public key over and over
again).
Searches can be of the form:
1) URI Scheme request (http, https, ftp, gopher, file, etc)
2) File Name (or parts of file name)
3) Data in file (words, phrases, ANDed words or ORed words)
The search with a unique public key is passed from the Anonymous Machine
to all Intermediary Servers. A search hash is a hash of the search data
plus the public key (this is to make each search unique) and is added to
the search request. When a search request is seen, a lookup of the
search hash is made on the server in the "already known searches" search
table and if the hash of the search matches a already received search,
the search is dropped (this search has already been through this
machine). If the search is not dropped, the search hash is stored in a
lookup table with the anonymous machine Node ID that the search was
received from. The Intermediary Server passes the entire search with
the new sequence number to all Intermediary Servers Anonymous Machines
and End Point machines it knows except for the machine the search
request came from (the server doesn't know what "kind" of machine it is
connected to). If an end point machine can satisfy the request / has
matches for the request then that data relating to the request is
encrypted using the public key and passed back to the Intermediary
Server with the search response hash number. The search response hash
of the Node ID that has a positive response is added to the "already
known searches" table hash so that if the search response is requested
the Anonymous Machine and Endpoint can be brought together to
communicate. When positive responses are received then those responses
are returned via the routing (above) to the Node ID that initiated the
request. The Anonymous Machine should by operator choice or by random
choose a response to act on the request. Note: To further obfuscate the
"real" requests, Anonymous Machines should take random incoming requests
/ pick random words and send them out as fake requests to Intermediary
Servers. Results from these fake requests are, of course, ignored.
When the search table fills, requests are dropped in a FIFO manner for a
specific Node ID. If someone tries to flood the network with requests
to empty the tables, only the Node ID they are connected to will suffer,
not other Node ID's.
Note: The positive responses to the search may be a form of "I can act
as your proxy for that URL, but I don't have the URL" or "I have the
entire URL, and this is the last date that I accessed that page plus
here is the hash of the data on that page". The operator can choose
whether they want a copy (possibly stale) or if they want to chose a
proxy that can get the current page. All links on that page are
different files that are searched / requested for. Additionally (in
this manner) the Anonymous Anonymity network could host its own WWW
network where those pages were only accessible to someone connected to
the Anonymous Anonymity network, or via a machine proxying for the
Anonymous Anonymity network.
When the Anonymous Requester receives a request that is acceptable, a
connection request is sent along the path that is in the response data
using the search hash connection pair generated in the previous
paragraph. This connection request has a new public key associated with
the request. The Intermediary Proxy Server sends out a request on all
connections for a proxy and randomly chooses one of those responses and
requests that Intermediary Proxy IP address. The IP address of this
Intermediary Proxy is sent to the path of both the End Point machine and
the Anonymous Requester.
The End Point machine and the Anonymous Requester set up connections
with the Intermediary Proxy on TCP Port 80. Again, data is encrypted
and then HTTPEncoded. The Intermediary Proxy knows the source and
destination, but not what data is being exchanged. When the data
exchange is complete the connection is terminated.
The whole idea behind this network is for each node to know the minimum
information for the system to work. The less a node knows the less
information that can be pieced together to get the whole picture. In
training for Security Clearances the quote goes something like
"Unclassified information can easily be combined to reveal classified
information."
File name:
The file name is retuned with a SHA-2 hash and a SHA-2 hash dictionary.
The SHA-2 hash is just a SHA-2 hash of the file. The SHA-2 Hash
Dictionary is a SHA-2 hash of "X" bytes of the file (where "X" is size
of file / 1023 and where "X" is greater than 32 KBytes). The Anonymous
Machine would request chunk "y" of the file from the End Point. These
requests would continue until the Anonymous Machine has all the chunks
it needs or until the connection is broken. In this manner the
Anonymous Machine could be requesting parts of a particular file while
also sending out parts of a particular file to other users. If the file
is less than 32 MBytes then the hash table would be 32 KBytes chunks of
the file with the number of hashes indicated in the hash table. This
hash allows (in the case, for example, of large FTP URI Scheme requests)
requests to be made of parts of the file being requested if it is a
large file. The file hash and the hash segment of the file would be
requested, therefore several machines could be sending parts of the file
to the anonymous requester at the same time.
Issues:
1) The issue with a party owning the server and the anonymous proxier
and / or the intermediary machine. This is essentially the Man In The
Middle attack. The attacker "owns" the server in the middle which
directs the anonymous machine to proxies and end point devices that it
also controls, therefore the server knows the anonymous machine and what
they are requesting. Same thing if the attacker wants to find out what
files are on the end point machine, they act like the anonymous
requester and the intermediary servers / proxies and make requests.
2) HTTPS connections. The HTTPS transfer would require several data
requests that would require the end point to serve up multiple pages to
the anonymous requester. the Man In The Middle attack would be
mitigated by the fact that the anonymous requester would be able to
verify the SSL certificate of the site that they are visiting.
3) Abuse of the anonymous system by someone who is stalking, etc. The
IP address of the proxier is the address that shows up on the logs and
stalking / spamming / etc. would be blamed on whoever owns the IP
Proxier address.
4) Not being able to make HTTP requests that divulge the end stations IP
address. (Example http://www.whatismyip.com/ )
5) Creation of HHTPEncode algorithm that ensures even letter
distribution / HTML format of data.
6) Spammers - Assuming that the this system is programmed in open
source, you will (at some time) have some smart spammer figure out a way
to redirect HTTP requests to them and they will serve out their own
spamvertized pages. Same with data files, nodes could put out data
files that have nothing to do with the request made. A local file
should be kept where the user can ignore all responses from a specific
Node ID. The file would be only locally significant because if it
became global then nefarious people could "poison" sites that are
serving out good information and say that these are "bad" sites.
i) Newman, Ron and Copeland, Frank "The Church of Scientology vs. Grady
Ward" (Specifically "Scientology targets ISPs and anonymous remailers").
URL: http://www.xs4all.nl/~kspaink/cos/r...grady/home.html
Wednesday, July 24, 1996 (Accessed July 4, 2005)
ii) IANA Registry of URI Schemes "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
SCHEMES". URL: http://www.iana.org/assignments/uri-schemes 03 June 2005
(Accessed July 4, 2005)
I would appreciate any and all comments on the above Anonymous Anonymity
network. Specifically any solutions to the presented problems or if
someone has already covered this ground I would appreciate pointers to
their work.
Thank you for your comments.
Ken Hollis
---------------------------------------------------------------
Do not meddle in the affairs of wizards for they are subtle and
quick to anger.
Ken Hollis - Gandalf The White - gandalf@digital.net - O- TINLC
WWW Page - http://digital.net/~gandalf/
Trace E-Mail forgery - http://digital.net/~gandalf/spamfaq.html
Trolls crossposts - http://digital.net/~gandalf/trollfaq.html
Woodworking For Geeks - http://digital.net/~gandalf/woodmain.htm
| |
| MyTwoCents 2005-07-05, 2:46 am |
| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: RIPEMD160
In <gandalf-475848.23461804072005@news.central.cox.net>,
gandalf@digital.net wrote:
>Greetings and Salutations:
>
>On The Internet - July 4, 2005
>A Declaration of Anonymity
>
>Anonymous Anonymity - Request For Comments
>
>"I think paranoia can be instructive in the right doses. Paranoia is a
You have just described freenet.
http://freenetproject.org
With version 0.5 build 5103, it is now running better than ever before.
Toad is working on 0.7, which is expected to be a major milestone in overal
improvement of the freenet network.
I just wish that it didn't have to be in java.. native .exe's run *SO* much
faster and eat less resources.
- --
My public keys can be found on my freenet site:
SSK@TEx6TiaPeszpV4AFw3ToutDb49EPAgM/mytwocents/23//m2ckey.html
(*NOTE* you must be running freenet for this link to be usefull)
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rtA0AnRnr
OeI4K+vR0tsxdLeh8cqvFpvH
=90wx
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This message was posted via one or more anonymous remailing services.
The original sender is unknown. Any address shown in the From header
is unverified. You need a valid hashcash token to post to groups other
than alt.test and alt.anonymous.messages. Visit www.panta-rhei.dyndns.org
for abuse and hashcash info.
| |
| Thomas J. Boschloo 2005-07-05, 5:47 pm |
| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Gandalf The White schreef:
<snip>
> Given that Country "C" restricts access to certain sites on "The
> Internet" located in country "A". Also given that country "C" wishes to
> gain knowledge of which of its citizens are trying to access restricted
> sites, country "C" could set up anonymous proxies in country "N" to
> monitor its own citizens. In addition if country "C" wished to monitor
> already popular anonymous sites for traffic, they could install a
> employee in the offices of the ISP that serves the popular anonymous
> site and have that employee surreptitiously monitor the traffic going to
> / leaving that site.
Country "C" would just block all proxies.
> The software will facilitate the transfer of files (HTTP, FTP, etc.)
> between two computers using anonymous proxies. Every machine will have
> "the least" amount of knowledge to make the transfer possible. One
> computer (the end point) will have access to the data and will know the
> intermediary proxy but will not know what computer the file is
> ultimately destined for. Another computer (the intermediary server or
> the intermediary proxy) will know what two computers the file is being
> transferred between but will not know the contents of the file. The
> last computer (The destination / anonymous machine) will know what the
> file is and who the proxy is, but not where the file is coming from.
Like MyTwoCents wrote, that sound a lot like Freenet by Ian Clarke
<http://freenet.sourceforge.net/> (official URL).
You might also like <http://sourceforge.net/projects/camerashy/>. It was
written with countries like "C" in mind.
The problem remains, how to download this software without drawing
attention onto oneself!
Salute,
Thomas
- --
Life is like a videogame with no chance to win - ATR
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| |
| Gandalf The White 2005-07-06, 2:46 am |
| Greetings and Salutations:
In article <L85Z2LK438538.6294791667@reece.net.au>,
"MyTwoCents <none@none.invalid>"@panta-rhei.dyndns.org wrote:
> In <gandalf-475848.23461804072005@news.central.cox.net>,
> gandalf@digital.net wrote:
> You have just described freenet.
> http://freenetproject.org
> With version 0.5 build 5103, it is now running better than ever before.
I will have to try the software again, previously the software killed by
Pentium III 750 MHz machine.
> Toad is working on 0.7, which is expected to be a major milestone in overal
> improvement of the freenet network.
Cool.
Yes, I have seen and run Freenet previously. I meant to give kudos to
the Freenet Project, but I rushed getting the final posting out last
night and forgot to include them. I have updated the information (and
made some minor revisions):
http://digital.net/~gandalf/Anonymous_Anonymity.htm
Generally I would ask that you take a few moments to re-read the
document, specifically I would ask that you read the following paragraph
that I have added:
"I have looked at The Freenet Project (iii), and they deserve the credit
in this project for the idea of a "shadow" Internet, but the Anonymous
Anonymity Network is fundamentally different. On The Freenet Project web
pages are published only on the The Freenet Project (and does not allow
for searching), the Anonymous Anonymity Network allows for searching of
not only files on the Anonymous Anonymity Network but also the anonymous
transfer of files into the Anonymous Anonymity Network from "The
Internet", thus connecting "The Internet" with the Anonymous Anonymity
Network. Also, the files do not have to be passed from node to node to
get to the final destination (as in The Freenet Project), they are
fetched and sent (via one hop) to the final requestor."
That is (IMHO) a huge difference between the two networks. One is self
contained, the other caches data from "The Internet" and throws it away
when it hasn't been accessed for a long time.
Obviously if someone wanted to preserve a web page that had been taken
down (because of choice or by legal requirement) then they could save it
in the Anonymous Anonymity Network.
In article <42cb0994$0$81598$e4fe514c@news.xs4all.nl>,
"Thomas J. Boschloo" <nospam@hccnet.invalid> wrote:
> Gandalf The White schreef:
> <snip>
<snip>[vbcol=seagreen]
> Country "C" would just block all proxies.
True, but if they were trying to find out what citizens were subversive,
wouldn't they want to track some? With the Anonymous Anonymity Network
*any* computer could be a proxy.
> Like MyTwoCents wrote, that sound a lot like Freenet by Ian Clarke
> <http://freenet.sourceforge.net/> (official URL).
Yes, please see above.
> You might also like <http://sourceforge.net/projects/camerashy/>. It was
> written with countries like "C" in mind.
Thank you :-) ... I will take a look.
> The problem remains, how to download this software without drawing
> attention onto oneself!
I need to add that to my list of problems. That is a very good point.
Thank you for your additional comments.
Ken Hollis
---------------------------------------------------------------
Do not meddle in the affairs of wizards for they are subtle and
quick to anger.
Ken Hollis - Gandalf The White - gand...@digital.net - O- TINLC
WWW Page - http://digital.net/~gandalf/
Trace E-Mail forgery - http://digital.net/~gandalf/spamfaq.html
Trolls crossposts - http://digital.net/~gandalf/trollfaq.html
Woodworking For Geeks - http://digital.net/~gandalf/woodmain.htm
| |
| Anonymous 2005-07-07, 2:46 am |
| In article <gandalf-DE63BB.21542405072005@news.central.cox.net>
Gandalf The White <gandalf@digital.net> wrote:
>
> Greetings and Salutations:
>
> In article <L85Z2LK438538.6294791667@reece.net.au>,
> "MyTwoCents <none@none.invalid>"@panta-rhei.dyndns.org wrote:
>
> I will have to try the software again, previously the software killed by
> Pentium III 750 MHz machine.
I have run it on a 120 MHz Pentium (no bloody I, II, III, OR IV!)
w/64mb ram for months now.
Granted, the JVM uses most of the system resources, and I have
to shut it down when I need the system for anything else. but
nonetheless it works.
the machine you mentioned above would be a dream for me, I'd be
able to run freenet AND do something else at the same time!
| |
| John Gustafson 2006-03-01, 7:48 am |
| "Gandalf The White" <gandalf@digital.net> wrote in message
news:gandalf-475848.23461804072005@news.central.cox.net...
> Greetings and Salutations:
>
>
> Abstract:
> The current state of anonymous proxies do not provide adequate
> protection for the entity wishing to preserve their anonymity.
> Anonymous remailers and their ISP's have had court orders to have their
> logs subpoenaed in court (i). There is also a "trust" that the
> anonymous proxy is truly anonymous.
>
True, true. But what about anonymous services like Concreteweb.com? They
don't keep logs. Anonymous is just that - anonymous. No logging. So isn't
this
really a choice or instance of caveat emptor? Some anonymous services
are horrible and are thin veneers for those who are really looking for
something good.
Other services are great.
So...your comment of "the current state of anonymous..." is way too broad of
a brush stroke.
> Given that Country "C" restricts access to certain sites on "The
> Internet" located in country "A". Also given that country "C" wishes to
> gain knowledge of which of its citizens are trying to access restricted
> sites, country "C" could set up anonymous proxies in country "N" to
> monitor its own citizens. In addition if country "C" wished to monitor
> already popular anonymous sites for traffic, they could install a
> employee in the offices of the ISP that serves the popular anonymous
> site and have that employee surreptitiously monitor the traffic going to
> / leaving that site.
>
Which is why most people I know only deal and work with reputable companies
that have a track record - and provide *other Internet services. I am wary
of new
"stealth" and "anonymous" companies that seem to just pop up. My provider
has been
around for a long time and has a successful business running world class
email and web services
for companies all over the globe.
Good luck with your abstract!
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-03-01, 7:48 am |
| John Gustafson wrote:
> "Gandalf The White" <gandalf@digital.net> wrote in message
> news:gandalf-475848.23461804072005@news.central.cox.net...
> True, true. But what about anonymous services like Concreteweb.com? They
> don't keep logs. Anonymous is just that - anonymous. No logging. So
How do you know they don't keep logs? Because they say so? 
What about legal actions against them that don't permit disclosure?
What about a "disgruntled employee" who logs everything regardless of
company policy?
What about the fact that it's for all practical purposes impossible to run
a public service without some type of logging? How would they deal with
abuse complaints for example? Do they simply disconnect everyone who has a
complaint filed against their account? Do they allow any and all abuse?
How do they determine whose guilty and whose not without some sort of
record of activity?
It's really irrelevant anyway, because the issue of logging has little or
nothing to do with being anonymous. If the possibility even exists, the
service can not be considered anonymous. This is why only things like Tor
and Remailers can be considered anonymous.
Any subscription service knows who you are and/or provides a direct link
back to you that can be exploited by them or an outside party. It's
impossible for them not be in this position because they are an
identifiable point of contact in a real time environment.
That is NOT anonymity. Anonymity is defined by having no clear path back
to the originator that might be exploited. What you're discussing are
"privacy" services, and anyone who claims otherwise is misinformed, or
lying. There is no such thing as an account based, subscription anonymity
service. The very notion of subscribing and connecting to that service is
a direct contradiction to the definition of anonymity.
| |
| stingray@trilightzone.org 2006-03-01, 7:48 am |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed wrote:
> John Gustafson wrote:
>
>
>
>
> How do you know they don't keep logs? Because they say so?
>
> What about legal actions against them that don't permit disclosure?
>
> What about a "disgruntled employee" who logs everything regardless of
> company policy?
>
> What about the fact that it's for all practical purposes impossible to run
> a public service without some type of logging? How would they deal with
> abuse complaints for example? Do they simply disconnect everyone who has a
> complaint filed against their account? Do they allow any and all abuse?
> How do they determine whose guilty and whose not without some sort of
> record of activity?
>
> It's really irrelevant anyway, because the issue of logging has little or
> nothing to do with being anonymous. If the possibility even exists, the
> service can not be considered anonymous. This is why only things like Tor
> and Remailers can be considered anonymous.
>
> Any subscription service knows who you are and/or provides a direct link
> back to you that can be exploited by them or an outside party. It's
> impossible for them not be in this position because they are an
> identifiable point of contact in a real time environment.
>
> That is NOT anonymity. Anonymity is defined by having no clear path back
> to the originator that might be exploited. What you're discussing are
> "privacy" services, and anyone who claims otherwise is misinformed, or
> lying. There is no such thing as an account based, subscription anonymity
> service. The very notion of subscribing and connecting to that service is
> a direct contradiction to the definition of anonymity.
>
>
lol...you dumb puppet. Even Tor developers warn not to see Tor as all
anonymous, go check their site on tor.eff.org or check their irc channel
instead of spreading false information to ppl here. This goes also for
remailers. If you even ever used Tor yourself, which i doubt, you'd also
know that it gives a warning not to assume you're anonymous with Tor.
The best way of increasing your anonymity is to use a combination of
ways and not depend, unlike some puppets here, on remailers and/or only
Tor.
For that matter, any service, free or not free can be controlled or
bugged. You're probably better off with a non-free service then some
anonymous proxy or remailer in nigeria claiming to be anonymous and not
knowing who is behind it and/or what terms they have on the use.
Anonymity can be gained in many ways, and yes you can even pay hard cash
or e-gold for example and none will lead back to you if you do it right.
So if we have to believe your view of anonymity it means you can't even
leave the bushes to buy food or drive a car cause you might get
recognized or taped ? ;-) Or that you shouldn't have cash on you anyway
because your fingerprints are on it ? Or avoid animals for they might
recognize you next time ? Think you dumb puppet and stop giving false
info to ppl here.
PS: you can start your flaming after reading this, it'll just show
you're some TLA puppet trying to misinform ppl and let them rely on only
single point solutions.
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-03-01, 7:48 am |
| stingray@trilightzone.org wrote:
> remailers. If you even ever used Tor yourself, which i doubt, you'd also
> know that it gives a warning not to assume you're anonymous with Tor.
Uh, fukwit, did you happen to read what that notice says just BEFORE that
blurb? The part about being experimental?
I know this is really really tough for your oxygen starved brain to wrap
itself around, but proved anonymous methods will ALWAYS have such
disclaimers attached to them while under real world development. The
methods under the Tor hood are considered acceptably anonymous by anyone
who knows anything about it, but your bullshit services are not. The
disclaimer is there because the developers have something nobody like you
can ever lay any claim to without making everyone in earshot laugh... it's
called integrity.
That's is why you have to play your childish little game of trying to
paint that common sense disclaimer as some admission that Tor is not a
true anonymous system. You're not attacking Tor, you're attacking the
thing that makes you look the worst. Someone being honest.
> The best way of increasing your anonymity is to use a combination of ways
> and not depend, unlike some puppets here, on remailers and/or only Tor.
Baloney. Tor and remailers make the rest superficial fluff. They're so far
beyond anything you snake oil peddlers offer it makes you insignificant.
That's why you nym hop in desperation every time one of your other puppets
get's it's XXX kicked, just to make one more pathetic attempt to divert
attention away from your FUD and lies about your honeypots being in any
way anonymous.
> For that matter, any service, free or not free can be controlled or
> bugged. You're probably better off with a non-free service then some
ROTFL!
What a TOTAL load of bullshit!
The mere fact that you have to PAY someone in some way means they have one
more way to track you. It's a DAMN hard connection back to the user.
That's why you snakes have to suggest people use things like Tor to sign
up and use your crap.
> anonymous proxy or remailer in nigeria claiming to be anonymous and not
> knowing who is behind it and/or what terms they have on the use.
Doesn't matter one nit whether one remailer or a Tor node is "anonymous".
Fact is, no one ANYTHING can be anonymous. That's why Tor and remailers
use combinations of things like layered encryption, packet fragmenting,
latency, etc. They're DESIGNED with the fact that a node can be
compromised in mind.
And what "design" do you use to prevent the compromised servers you have
no control over from being nothing more than data mining operations for
the privacy trashing governments that control them? Your big mouth?
> Anonymity can be gained in many ways,
That's what you'd like people to believe because your wallet depends on
it, but every expert on the planet says you're full of shit.
> and yes you can even pay hard cash
> or e-gold for example and none will lead back to you if you do it right.
Oh yeah? How's that? I thought YOU provided anonymity, fukwit? So why are
you AGAIN suggesting people have to take additional steps to isolate
themselves from YOUR lying XXX? Not as anonymous as you'd like to
pretend, eh?
LOL!
You're your own worst enemy.
> So if we have to believe your view of anonymity it means you can't even
It's not MY view. It's the accepted standard agreed upon by every expert
in the field. Things like Tor and remailers ARE anonymous. Liars like you
only CLAIM to be. Sucks to be you, but that's just the simple facts of
life and math. Live with it.
> leave the bushes to buy food or drive a car cause you might get
> recognized or taped ?
Maybe in your paranoid delusions it's necessary to be anonymous to go
shopping. Rest assured those of us who are sane don't even think about it.
> ;-) Or that you shouldn't have cash on you anyway
> because your fingerprints are on it ? Or avoid animals for they might
> recognize you next time ? Think you dumb puppet and stop giving false
> info to ppl here.
You really ARE grasping at straws, aren't you? <snicker>
>
> PS: you can start your flaming after reading this, it'll just show
> you're some TLA puppet trying to misinform ppl and let them rely on only
> single point solutions.
No, it will show that in spite of you having your XXX handed to you under
a couple of your other nyms, we never tire of handing it to you under this
one. It shows what a pathetic looser you are, having to preach the same
lies with a different hat on because you were so thoroughly embarrassed as
"travelerpuppet#66" and "brainfart". <snicker>
Now YOU can drag those two puppets back out just to pretend you're not all
the same shitstain. Of course "Twatlight" was the nym you XXXXed up a long
time ago, replying in the first person to a post directed at someone else.
LOL!
Isn't it about time to invent some new puppets? All your old ones have
been beat up so much they look a little rough.
| |
| stingray@trilightzone.org 2006-03-01, 5:47 pm |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed wrote:
> stingray@trilightzone.org wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Uh, fukwit, did you happen to read what that notice says just BEFORE that
> blurb? The part about being experimental?
<trash/dump/puppet-poo>
i didn't even bother to read your answer since i know it's full of
poopoo. So don't bother you dumb puppet of puppets, i keep it on what
the tor-developers and their site on what to believe instead you little
naughty boy
| |
|
| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
["Followup-To:" header set to alt.privacy.anon-server.]
On Wed, 01 Mar 2006 15:31:05 +0100, stingray@trilightzone.org wrote in
Message-Id: <4405a5cc$0$13150$450c70f1@news.privacy.li>:
> i didn't even bother to read your answer since i know it's full of
> poopoo. So don't bother you dumb puppet of puppets, i keep it on what
> the tor-developers and their site on what to believe instead you little
> naughty boy
Try reading it but ignoring the insults, the actual content is quite
correct. Systems like Tor are developed by people of strong integrity
who are trying to create something that is bombproof in anonymity terms.
Their claims are honest and accurate.
<analogy>
The manufacturer of a bulletproof jacket would advertise that jacket as
great, but probably display reluctance to being shot at whilst wearing
it. That's because commercial claims are usually exaggerated. However,
if the manufacturer is going to be shot, he would certainly prefer to
have the jacket on.
</analogy>
Tor is not commercial, it has no need for exaggerated claims and so it
will retain disclaimers until such time as it is proven by unbiased
experts to offer the anonymity it strives to deliver. That doesn't mean
it's broken, just that it's not fully proven to be perfect in every
scenario.
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--
pub 1024D/8ED57743 2003-07-08 Bananasplit Operator
Key fingerprint = 796F 67E0 E890 A0BB BDAE EBB4 94A6 7A09 8ED5 7743
uid Admin <admin.bananasplit.info>
| |
| George Orwell 2006-03-03, 6:00 pm |
| stingray@trilightzone.org wrote:
> Borked Pseudo Mailed wrote:
>
> <trash/dump/puppet-poo>
>
> i didn't even bother to read your answer since i know it's full of poopoo.
Translation:
"Everything you said was completely correct. I have no defense."
How pathetic. Puppet66 and puppethat get their asses handed to them so all
of a sudden strinkray appears again. After a whole day of wound licking of
course. Now stinkray gets demolished in a single post because he once
again can't answer to the same truths that have been a clue-by-four up
side his head since day one.
All comes back to the basics, don't it? No matter how much you screech, no
matter how many pathetic attempts you make to give the appearance of
someone who agrees with you, you're still just a pathetic little dweeb
desperately trying to defend himself from the stark reality that he's
wrong. Plain vanilla wrong. 
| |
| traveler 66 2006-03-03, 6:00 pm |
| George Orwell wrote:
> stingray@trilightzone.org wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Translation:
>
> "Everything you said was completely correct. I have no defense."
>
> How pathetic. Puppet66 and puppethat get their asses handed to them so all
> of a sudden strinkray appears again. After a whole day of wound licking of
> course. Now stinkray gets demolished in a single post because he once
> again can't answer to the same truths that have been a clue-by-four up
> side his head since day one.
>
> All comes back to the basics, don't it? No matter how much you screech, no
> matter how many pathetic attempts you make to give the appearance of
> someone who agrees with you, you're still just a pathetic little dweeb
> desperately trying to defend himself from the stark reality that he's
> wrong. Plain vanilla wrong.
>
>
The only one that looks like a drip here is the one poster that seems to
want to ignore what TOR says right on their site (that would be you).
Stingray brought up some pretty good points, if abuse is all you know,
it's all you can give, nothing new for those reading your posts.
If all you can do is flame with your opinion, and abuse others for
theirs, well what can I say, go get logged, it's what you know best.
As far as answers, speaking for myself, your no-one to tell anyone
ignoring your posts means they are left speechless. I'll give you a
hint, it may mean your not worth their time of day.
| |
| George Orwell 2006-03-03, 6:00 pm |
| traveler 66 wrote:
> The only one that looks like a drip here is the one poster that seems to
> want to ignore what TOR says right on their site (that would be you).
Nobody's ignoring anything. They're just not misrepresenting what's said
to discredit a truly anonymous method, because they don't need to engage
in such juvenile games to try and make their other misrepresentations more
believable. The reason you lie about Tor is the same reason you lie about
privacy.lie and your other services being anonymous.
> Stingray brought up some pretty good points, if abuse is all you know,
You deserve nothing more. You're a liar, a child, and you do nothing BUT
foist personal attacks against anyone who posts fact or gives good advice.
You add nothing to any of these groups, and when you try, you fail
miserably. Understandable, as someone who builds their life on lies really
has nothing but personal attacks in their arsenal, and someone as
incompetent when it comes to technical matters really can't be expected to
have anything useful to offer, but understanding your idiocy doesn't mean
we have to treat you any better than you deserve to be treated.
We've tried to educate you in technical matters, tried to get you to see
that operating in an honest way would benefit you as well as your
customers, and yes, we've even tried to get you to just keep quiet. You'll
have none of any of it, so now you're just a XXXXX we slap around when we
feel like it. Welcome to the reality your childish, devious behavior has
provided for you. No respect, no credibility, and no usefulness beyond
your role as an amusing example we can point to when trying to explain the
term "snake oil" to a newbie.
> it's all you can give, nothing new for those reading your posts.
When you devise some new lies, maybe we'll have some more material to work
with. So far you're entire repertoire consists of "is not", and "you're
Steve".
>
> If all you can do is flame with your opinion, and abuse others for theirs,
Your's isn't an opinion, it's an agenda. And you'll stop at no amount of
juvenile games or glaring stupidity to promote it. No matter how ignorant
you make yourself appear you continue down the same path. Then turn
around and accuse everyone else of being the only thing that you've ever
been. Abuse is all you get, because abuse is all you deserve.
> well what can I say, go get logged, it's what you know best. As far as
No thanks, I'll stay as far away from privacy.lie and your other honeypot
"services" as I can. We know you lie about logging because you used your
logs to track people down.
> answers, speaking for myself, your no-one to tell anyone ignoring your
You keep barking when a "no-one" jerks your leash, don't you? You have no
choice. You're desperate. Scared to death that the truth might be spoken
unanswered.
> posts means they are left speechless. I'll give you a hint, it may mean
> your not worth their time of day.
The last thing you are is speechless. You dredge up another nym when
you've been beaten so badly you have nothing left to say, then start your
same song and dance over again.
| |
| stingray@trilightzone.org 2006-03-03, 6:00 pm |
| George Orwell wrote:
<cut/trash/dump/puppet/cotse>
Hey cotse puppet, go get a life man, and again, didn't bother to read
your whining and screaming, trying to convince ppl of your cotse
TLA-financed service, tell them about the logs Tell them about the
scams Georgy boh !
| |
| George Orwell 2006-03-03, 6:00 pm |
| stingray@trilightzone.org wrote:
> George Orwell wrote:
>
> <cut/trash/dump/puppet/cotse>
>
> Hey cotse puppet, go get a life man, and again, didn't bother to read your
> whining and screaming, trying to convince ppl of your cotse TLA-financed
> service, tell them about the logs Tell them about the scams Georgy boh
> !
Only asstarded fukwits post replies just to say they haven't read a post.
It's like announcing a *plonk*.... a sure sign you're lying like a Persian
rug.
|
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