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Home > Archive > Anonymous Servers > April 2006 > Have remailers ever been put to the test?
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| Author |
Have remailers ever been put to the test?
|
|
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| I don't mean the test of getting by the Church of Scientology, or the
government of Bolivia. I'm talking about getting by a first-world
government that has an overall view of what conversation enters where and
exits where.
Anonymity and certain kinds of criminality sound like they are made for
each other.
Has anybody, for example, tried using a 10-remailer chain to say that they
plan to kill George Bush by launching a missle at the White house on a
specific date a couple of weeks in the future?
It would be highly illegal, but shouldn't the criminal be completely
secure if remailers are what they are advertised to be?
I'm not suggesting it should be done, just wondering why it hasn't been
done (to my knowledge), given the supposed security of remailers, and the
nuttiness and criminality of many posters on many usenet groups.
| |
| Thrasher Remailer 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| In article <bd6115361910393cdfad3148e98fe89e@pseudo.borked.net>
Borked Pseudo Mailed <nobody@pseudo.borked.net> wrote:
>
> I don't mean the test of getting by the Church of Scientology, or the
> government of Bolivia. I'm talking about getting by a first-world
> government that has an overall view of what conversation enters where and
> exits where.
>
> Anonymity and certain kinds of criminality sound like they are made for
> each other.
>
> Has anybody, for example, tried using a 10-remailer chain to say that they
> plan to kill George Bush by launching a missle at the White house on a
> specific date a couple of weeks in the future?
>
> It would be highly illegal, but shouldn't the criminal be completely
> secure if remailers are what they are advertised to be?
>
> I'm not suggesting it should be done, just wondering why it hasn't been
> done (to my knowledge), given the supposed security of remailers, and the
> nuttiness and criminality of many posters on many usenet groups.
Given the nuttiness and criminality of people in general, I can only believe
it has been done, and considering that a breech of security in the
remailers in such a case would surely become common knowledge very quickly
in one way or another (and hasn't), I have come to a personal conclusion
that a good chain is secure.
| |
| nemo_outis 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| Thrasher Remailer <thrasher@reece.net.au> wrote in
news:285GX8OI38822.4703703704@reece.net.au:
> In article <bd6115361910393cdfad3148e98fe89e@pseudo.borked.net>
> Borked Pseudo Mailed <nobody@pseudo.borked.net> wrote:
>
> Given the nuttiness and criminality of people in general, I can only
> believe it has been done, and considering that a breech of security in
> the remailers in such a case would surely become common knowledge very
> quickly in one way or another (and hasn't), I have come to a personal
> conclusion that a good chain is secure.
I will give my limited knowledge about how LEAs work in a parallel
situation.
If a useful informant discloses information that will incriminate
someone, the subsequent prosecution will seldom call on that informant as
witness thereby outing and burning him. No, instead corroborative
evidence (often of the very same point) is sought from alternative
sources and by alternate means which *can* be disclosed. (If the
informant's info is good this is almost always achievable.)
IOW if the NSA could break the mixmaster network (although I'm *not*
saying it can) it would be very unwise and imprudent of them to disclose
this ability (except perhaps for something as important as Osama, but
perhaps not even then). Instead, there will be some bullshit about
cracking the computer's password, a confederate squealing, or some other
somewhat plausible story, and THAT will be claimed as how the perp was
caught.
So even if the NSA can crack mixmaster I don't expect to hear about it
any time soon.
Regards,
| |
| Anonymous 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed <nobody@pseudo.borked.net> wrote in
news:bd6115361910393cdfad3148e98fe89e@ps
eudo.borked.net:
> I don't mean the test of getting by the Church of Scientology, or the
> government of Bolivia. I'm talking about getting by a first-world
> government that has an overall view of what conversation enters where
> and exits where.
>
> Anonymity and certain kinds of criminality sound like they are made
> for each other.
>
> Has anybody, for example, tried using a 10-remailer chain to say that
> they plan to kill George Bush by launching a missle at the White house
> on a specific date a couple of weeks in the future?
>
> It would be highly illegal, but shouldn't the criminal be completely
> secure if remailers are what they are advertised to be?
>
> I'm not suggesting it should be done, just wondering why it hasn't
> been done (to my knowledge), given the supposed security of remailers,
> and the nuttiness and criminality of many posters on many usenet
> groups.
>
Ok, here you go:
I plan to kill George Bush by launching a missle at the White house
on a specific date a couple of weeks in the future.
Anonymous
| |
| traveler 66 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
|
"Anonymous" <anon@comments.header> wrote in message
news:EPDQLKPS38821.9919791667@twistycreek.com...
> Borked Pseudo Mailed <nobody@pseudo.borked.net> wrote in
> news:bd6115361910393cdfad3148e98fe89e@ps
eudo.borked.net:
>
>
> Ok, here you go:
>
> I plan to kill George Bush by launching a missle at the White house
> on a specific date a couple of weeks in the future.
>
> Anonymous
Subject: What is "food for the NSA line-eater"?
This refers to the alleged scanning of all Usenet traffic by the
National Security Agency (and possibly other intelligence
organizations) for interesting keywords. The "food" is believed to
contain some of those keywords in the fond hope of overloading NSA's
poor computers. Other posters have taken up this practice, either
as an ambiguous form of political statement, or as an attempt at
humor. The bottom line is that excessive signatures in any form are
discouraged, the joke has worn stale amongst long-time net readers,
and there are specific newsgroups for the discussion of politics.
| |
| Senor Mantanza 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| In article <Xns97A5DC916BF6abcxyzcom@204.153.244.170>
"nemo_outis" <abc@xyz.com> wrote:
>
> Thrasher Remailer <thrasher@reece.net.au> wrote in
> news:285GX8OI38822.4703703704@reece.net.au:
>
>
>
>
> I will give my limited knowledge about how LEAs work in a parallel
> situation.
>
> If a useful informant discloses information that will incriminate
> someone, the subsequent prosecution will seldom call on that informant as
> witness thereby outing and burning him. No, instead corroborative
> evidence (often of the very same point) is sought from alternative
> sources and by alternate means which can be disclosed. (If the
> informant's info is good this is almost always achievable.)
>
> IOW if the NSA could break the mixmaster network (although I'm not
> saying it can) it would be very unwise and imprudent of them to disclose
> this ability (except perhaps for something as important as Osama, but
> perhaps not even then). Instead, there will be some bullshit about
> cracking the computer's password, a confederate squealing, or some other
> somewhat plausible story, and THAT will be claimed as how the perp was
> caught.
>
> So even if the NSA can crack mixmaster I don't expect to hear about it
> any time soon.
>
> Regards,
This is correct. If the NSA were able to compromise mixmaster
and identify the sender of the offending message, they would not
immediately take action to pursue prosecution. They would most
likely conduct intense surveillance on the sender, and bust them
on what they discover using the more conventional surveillance.
This would mean that they resort to the examples you gave above
as means of prosecuting the case.
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| On Sat, 15 Apr 2006 10:10:24 +0000, Senor Mantanza wrote:
> In article <Xns97A5DC916BF6abcxyzcom@204.153.244.170> "nemo_outis"
> <abc@xyz.com> wrote:
>
> This is correct. If the NSA were able to compromise mixmaster and
> identify the sender of the offending message, they would not immediately
> take action to pursue prosecution. They would most likely conduct intense
> surveillance on the sender, and bust them on what they discover using the
> more conventional surveillance. This would mean that they resort to the
> examples you gave above as means of prosecuting the case.
That sounds very plausible and I'm sure that's an accurate outline of how
they do it.
I am curious about some of the details of the surveillance, if they can be
mentioned without giving away the store.
This is just speculation, but maybe somebody can correct it or add to it.
If somebody is a suspect and it is thought his home computer might contain
useful information, then he will probably be hit with one or more viruses
that none of the anti-virus vendors knows exists. Instead of mining his
computer for credit card numbers, it will look for passwords to his
mixmaster keys, the secret keyring, etc.
The virus will probably be used concurrently on the computers of many
people of interest to the LEA community. After the virus has been around
long enough to do its job, it will suddenly appear 'in the wild', be
sent to everybody's computer, and anti-virus vendors will devise patches,
and announcements will be made about the latest East European criminal
gang's money-stealing scheme.
If remailers are thought to be useful to criminals, then remailer
operators would be logical targets for special attention of this kind.
If the suspect has a GM car made since 1999, Onstar hardware will be
installed on it even if he hasn't subscribed to it and had it turned on.
Now it will be turned on, but he won't know about it.
If the suspect owns a cell phone, it will be turned into an open
microphone even if he thinks it is turned off.
Depending on your level of paranoia, you might assume that every Intel
chip and every copy of windows has a back door. Or that many of the
'anti-virus' products, especially the ones that work so well and yet are
free, are doing more than looking for viruses.
Depending on how small audio bugs are these days, and they probably get
smaller by the month, it might be easy to place them in a vehicle or home
without breaking and entering. A LEA wet dream - the dust-mote bug. It
must be on the way if it's not here already.
| |
|
| On 2006-04-15, Borked Pseudo Mailed probably said,
[...]
> This is just speculation, but maybe somebody can correct it or add to it.
> If somebody is a suspect and it is thought his home computer might contain
> useful information, then he will probably be hit with one or more viruses
> that none of the anti-virus vendors knows exists. Instead of mining his
> computer for credit card numbers, it will look for passwords to his
> mixmaster keys, the secret keyring, etc.
>
> The virus will probably be used concurrently on the computers of many
> people of interest to the LEA community. After the virus has been around
> long enough to do its job, it will suddenly appear 'in the wild', be
> sent to everybody's computer, and anti-virus vendors will devise patches,
> and announcements will be made about the latest East European criminal
> gang's money-stealing scheme.
A "virus" as such, in its simplest form, is simply a disruptive and
destructive thing. To deploy *active malicious code* via viral
infestation routes, and have the target machines run that code, is
another game altogether, and one that might be better described, in the
case of planned covert modifications to multiple targets, as "spiking"
rather that just refering to a "virus" as if it were some kind of
advanced "cyber-tool".
Also, many amateur theorists base their assumptions about viral
infections on the virtually insecurable M$ operating system, having no
real idea how difficult it is to even deliver covert malicious code to a
reasonably well setup UNIX/Linux machine, let alone get that target
machine to run that code (almost impossible on even a half secured UNIX
machine) without leaving a trace somewhere in the system.
In other words, even though it may be theoretically possible, the odds
against continued undiscovered/documented operations are astronomically
small.
Therefore, either its paranoia, or it only applies to the world of XP
users, who may not even understand enough about the more complex IT
world around them to even be of interest to those who might be "spiking"
their machines in the first place. ;)
--
http://tinyurl.com/puefx
http://tinyurl.com/zxzmz
| |
| Anonymous 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
|
##
References: <bd6115361910393cdfad3148e98fe89e@pseudo.borked.net> <EPDQLKPS38821.9919791667@twistycreek.com> <4440b792$0$24091$450c70f1@news.privacy.li>
On Sat, 15 Apr 2006 09:51:43 GMT, traveler 66 wrote in alt.privacy:
>
> "Anonymous" <anon@comments.header> wrote in message
> news:EPDQLKPS38821.9919791667@twistycreek.com...
>
> Subject: What is "food for the NSA line-eater"?
>
> This refers to the alleged scanning of all Usenet traffic by the
> National Security Agency (and possibly other intelligence
> organizations) for interesting keywords. The "food" is believed
> to contain some of those keywords in the fond hope of overloading
> NSA's poor computers. Other posters have taken up this practice,
> either as an ambiguous form of political statement, or as an
> attempt at humor. The bottom line is that excessive signatures
> in any form are discouraged, the joke has worn stale amongst
> long-time net readers, and there are specific newsgroups for the
> discussion of politics.
>
>
>
You think this is a joke? Little you know...
Within 1 hour of posting this message, there were 15 jack-booted
agents of the NSA dressed like Ninjas storming in every door of
my home, demanding access to my computer.
It was a test. And IF the above had happened, then you would
certainly know the test had failed. The headlines would read
that someone had been arrested for "threatening the life of the
President by launching a missile at the White House."
Stay tuned...
Anonymous
| |
| George Orwell 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| nemo_outis wrote:
<snip excellent points regarding "confidential information" sources>
> So even if the NSA can crack mixmaster I don't expect to hear about it
> any time soon.
It's important to note that this concept translates to ANY system that's
regarded as secure, regardless of whether or not its proved mathematically
"difficult" to break. The argument that something is secure simply because
you haven't heard that it's been compromised is a fallacy. It's equally
plausible that you haven't heard about something being insecure BECAUSE
it's been compromised. Right from the start. ;)
This is one of the basic reasons many people say there's no such thing as
"good" security or anonymity in cyberspace. 
| |
| Nomen Nescio 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| On Sat, 15 Apr 2006, George Orwell <nobody@mixmaster.it> wrote:
>nemo_outis wrote:
>
><snip excellent points regarding "confidential information" sources>
>
>
>It's important to note that this concept translates to ANY system that's
>regarded as secure, regardless of whether or not its proved mathematically
>"difficult" to break. The argument that something is secure simply because
>you haven't heard that it's been compromised is a fallacy. It's equally
>plausible that you haven't heard about something being insecure BECAUSE
>it's been compromised. Right from the start. ;)
>
>This is one of the basic reasons many people say there's no such thing as
>"good" security or anonymity in cyberspace.
But a lot of those "many people" are the idiots who say "Of course they can
break it! They are the Governement!" as though the laws of mathematics or
physics don't apply to them.
It may not be completely unbreakable, primarily because of the human
element (weak passwords, that kind of thing), but you can make it so
difficult ( crossing international boundries & jurisdictions) as to be, for
all practical intents and purposes, unbreakable.
I for one do not believe that 3DES can be "cracked" open, even by the NSA.
If you do, you simply don't understand the math behind it.
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| On Sat, 15 Apr 2006 16:00:01 +0000, ACOG wrote:
> On 2006-04-15, Borked Pseudo Mailed probably said,
>
>
> A "virus" as such, in its simplest form, is simply a disruptive and
> destructive thing. To deploy *active malicious code* via viral infestation
> routes, and have the target machines run that code, is another game
> altogether,
Isn't that what every virus (or trojan or worm or whatever the right term
is) does that scans your hard drive for credit card information, etc?
At least, from reading the newspapers, this sort of malware seems to be a
dime a dozen, and is spewed out by criminals in Bulgaria, to pick a spot.
>
> Also, many amateur theorists base their assumptions about viral infections
> on the virtually insecurable M$ operating system,
Right. And that's because most computers are running that system.
> In other words, even though it may be theoretically possible, the odds
> against continued undiscovered/documented operations are astronomically
> small.
You're not addressing the topic. The speculation includes the realization
that the malware will eventually be discovered, but assumes it will be
passed off to the targets, and to everyone else, as just another
virus/trojan/worm that thieving Bulgarians are sending all over the world
in their attempt to steal credit card information.
| |
| nemo_outis 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| ....
> This is just speculation, but maybe somebody can correct it or add to
> it. If somebody is a suspect and it is thought his home computer might
> contain useful information, then he will probably be hit with one or
> more viruses that none of the anti-virus vendors knows exists. Instead
> of mining his computer for credit card numbers, it will look for
> passwords to his mixmaster keys, the secret keyring, etc.
>
> The virus will probably be used concurrently on the computers of many
> people of interest to the LEA community. After the virus has been
> around long enough to do its job, it will suddenly appear 'in the
> wild', be sent to everybody's computer, and anti-virus vendors will
> devise patches, and announcements will be made about the latest East
> European criminal gang's money-stealing scheme.
If your needs are not of the highest order then much of the following is
overkill/paranoia (but I believe one should have some idea of what
constitutes "full-bore" security and then back off from there to the
level you need. Approaching from above rather than below is the idea.)
One key principle is that the security of *any* networked machine is
dubious! (especially for that uber-network, the internet.) Accordingly,
one should run a plain vanilla machine with *nothing* important on it as
one's internet machine (i.e., there should be an "air gap" between this
and any other machine - it must not be networked locally!). It is
preferable if this machine runs a strong OS and browser, but there are
tradeoffs here between the system you know (even if it is not the
strongest) and the ideal system. Therefore I'm not going to go berserk
recommending OpenBSD, etc. but there is much to be said for this internet
machine firing up from a known-good CD (Knoppix, etc.) and only recording
data to some other medium (HD, USB stick, etc.)
Data is only tranferred from the isolated surfing (emailing, etc.)
machine to others after it has been checked (virus scan as a minimum,
full vmware sandboxing, etc. for the truly paranoid). For the hard-core,
no downloaded executable (and much "data" is potentially executable!)
will ever run on a networked machine or a machine that has sensitive data
but only on other isolated ones (not the surfing machine either).
All HDs on all machines should use full HD OTFE encryption (as much for
its resistance to planting software such as keyloggers as for its
resistance to surreptitious snooping).
Although I've left this to last it is, in fact, the first principle:
there is no security without physical security. Without writing a book
on the subject let me just say that you should have continuous control
and custody of your machines, but if that is impossible (e.g., you must
leave them to go to work) then, as a minimum, there should be multiple
reinforcing systems of tamper-resistance/tamper-indication. Locks on
doors can be bypassed (hell, even they'll cut through the Gyproc if they
have to) but every little bit helps (as the old lady said when pissing in
the ocean).
Regards,
PS. Some machines (such as the "internet appliance") can be very simple
and cheap (well under $500, especially if you use a KVM switch). (Yeah,
I know the keyboard culd be bugged.) While they are by no means
foolproof, it is wise to spend a few dollars (less than $50 in many
cases) on locks for your boxes and numbered tamper-resistant seals for
the boxes, keyboards, printers, etc. and just about everything else.)
The truly paranoid will have the computers "self-monitor" with a webcam
that continuously uploads offsite.
The core principle of secure alarms is NOT to "signal on problem" but to
regularly send an encrypted challenge/response version of "all's well."
Any interruption in that "alls's well" signal is the "deadman" signal
that, at the least, further investigation is warranted.
| |
| George Orwell 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| Nomen Nescio wrote:
> On Sat, 15 Apr 2006, George Orwell <nobody@mixmaster.it> wrote:
>
> But a lot of those "many people" are the idiots who say "Of course they
> can break it! They are the Governement!" as though the laws of mathematics
> or physics don't apply to them.
There's certainly a number of foil beanie types out there making silly
claims, but then there's also that majority of healthy skeptics who
realize the laws of mathematics and physics might very well be the fly in
the proverbial ointment.
>
> It may not be completely unbreakable, primarily because of the human
> element (weak passwords, that kind of thing), but you can make it so
> difficult ( crossing international boundries & jurisdictions) as to be,
> for all practical intents and purposes, unbreakable.
>
> I for one do not believe that 3DES can be "cracked" open, even by the NSA.
> If you do, you simply don't understand the math behind it.
I don't PERSONALLY believe 3DES has been broken, but there's something
very important you're not considering. All modern encryption schemes are
based on mathematical difficulties calculated using tools we know about.
IOW, the math behind factoring large semi-prime numbers fails miserably if
some innovative way of factoring is discovered, and there's not a credible
mathematician alive that will tell you something like that is out of the
question. Fact is, considerable progress in the area of factoring has
occurred in the last few years.
You're blindly relying on the "math behind it", apparently forgetting that
the math itself might be completely FUBAR. It certainly is possible that
the NSA has advanced the science and math considerably further than the
civilian world is aware of, although most experts agree it's "unlikely".
To my way of thinking, "unlikely" and "math says it can't be done" are not
synonymous. ;-)
| |
| Anonymous 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| In article <bd6115361910393cdfad3148e98fe89e@pseudo.borked.net>
Borked Pseudo Mailed <nobody@pseudo.borked.net> wrote:
>
> I'm not suggesting it should be done, just wondering why it hasn't been
> done (to my knowledge), given the supposed security of remailers, and the
> nuttiness and criminality of many posters on many usenet groups.
You gave yourself away there, eelbash.
| |
| George Orwell 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| > PS. Some machines (such as the "internet appliance") can be very simple
> and cheap (well under $500, especially if you use a KVM switch). (Yeah,
> I know the keyboard culd be bugged.) While they are by no means
> foolproof, it is wise to spend a few dollars (less than $50 in many
> cases) on locks for your boxes and numbered tamper-resistant seals for
> the boxes, keyboards, printers, etc. and just about everything else.)
> The truly paranoid will have the computers "self-monitor" with a webcam
> that continuously uploads offsite.
>
> The core principle of secure alarms is NOT to "signal on problem" but to
> regularly send an encrypted challenge/response version of "all's well."
> Any interruption in that "alls's well" signal is the "deadman" signal
> that, at the least, further investigation is warranted.
Home users that feel the need to do that are not just paranoid, but
probably suffering from some sort of paranoid schizophrenia illness.
| |
|
| Organization: CITC
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Date: Sun, 16 Apr 2006 11:29:49 GMT
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On 2006-04-15, Borked Pseudo Mailed probably said,
> On Sat, 15 Apr 2006 16:00:01 +0000, ACOG wrote:
>
>
> Isn't that what every virus (or trojan or worm or whatever the right term
> is) does that scans your hard drive for credit card information, etc?
No. All a virus essentially does is bugger things up. Malicious code is
designed to perform a task, rather than just make a mess.
For instance: A simple replicator process that floods your HDD is
malicious code, as it is actually doing something specific. It is in
effect a running program. A basic virus just buggers things up so what
should work doesn't, kinda like pouring a cuppa into the back of the
machine.
> At least, from reading the newspapers, this sort of malware seems to be a
> dime a dozen, and is spewed out by criminals in Bulgaria, to pick a spot.
Script-kiddie stuff, written to take advantage of M$ software, because
its so damn easy to do so.
>
> Right. And that's because most computers are running that system.
Mmmmmmmmmmm-kay?
>
> You're not addressing the topic.
Insofaras I was addressing a part of the topic, namely the difference
between a basic virus (disruptive mess-maker) and something with an
active payload (malicious active code), and the deployment of either, I
was. I was also making a point that you also made, that most
affected/targeted "nodes" will tend to be M$ users machines, just
because they are that easy to burgle.
The rest I'm still reading with interest. ;)
--
http://tinyurl.com/puefx
http://tinyurl.com/zxzmz
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| On Sun, 16 Apr 2006 11:29:49 +0000, ACOG wrote:
> On 2006-04-15, Borked Pseudo Mailed probably said,
>
>
> Script-kiddie stuff, written to take advantage of M$ software, because its
> so damn easy to do so.
>
So if it is easy for teenage hackers, not to mention Bulgarian thieves, to
write malware that can steal credit card information from computers
that run windows (that is what the newspapers say is being done, left and
right, night and day), then it must be a breeze for the US government to
write similar stuff that will monitor keystrokes or find passwords, secret
keys, etc.
They send this crap to the computers of people they are interested in,
remailer operators, for example, or anybody they don't like for whatever
reason, and collect the information they want, if things go well.
Then, when the malware has done its job or is discovered, they flood the
internet with copies of it, anti-malware vendors suddenly discover it 'in
the wild' and write patches for it.
At least that sounds like a reasonable way to do it.
And that's just one method. As I say, depending on your paranoia level,
you might believe that every Intel chip and every copy of windows has a
back door to it.
Combining appeals to patriotism and promises of riches beyond the dreams
of avarice, with threats of interminable federal investigations of real
and imagined wrongdoing - that sort of carrot-and-stick must concentrate
the mind of a CEO wonderfully.
If the government is doing this sort of wholesale sureveillance, it may be
from the best motives, but I'm not enough of a patriot to want some S.O.B.
sticking his nose into my computer. If that's what is necessary to keep
buildings from being brought down by terrorists, then we probably need a
new government.
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| ACOG wrote:
> No. All a virus essentially does is bugger things up. Malicious code is
> designed to perform a task, rather than just make a mess.
>
> For instance: A simple replicator process that floods your HDD is
> malicious code, as it is actually doing something specific. It is in
> effect a running program. A basic virus just buggers things up so what
> should work doesn't, kinda like pouring a cuppa into the back of the
> machine.
You have it completely XXX backwards.
A "basic virus" is meant to propagate. Spread from machine to machine. If
it buggers things up so the machines don't work, how is it going to
propagate? 
The "perfect" virus wouldn't affect machine operation at all. It would
replicate and spread without causing so much as a hiccup in any place it
happened to land.
Malicious code, in general, is code that's quite often designed to bugger
things up horribly. It can be the payload of a virus, a trojanized
software, spywayre, etc.... but in broad terms "malicious" means
destructive while "virus" just means replicating.
>
> Script-kiddie stuff, written to take advantage of M$ software, because its
> so damn easy to do so.
It's interesting to note that most of the people saying it's so easy to
do, have never actually done it.
Finding holes in Windows is no more or less difficult than finding holes
in any operating system. Exploiting them is an almost identical process
between the two. the only significant difference is the fact that on
typical Windows "end user" machines once you've got your foot in the door
you have the whole house while on *nix boxes you're usually still
restricted to a great extent.
| |
| Bison 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| >Has anybody, for example, tried using a 10-remailer chain to
say that they
>plan to kill George Bush by launching a missle at the White
house on a
>specific date a couple of weeks in the future?
A message with the above threat would 99.9% most probably be a
kook stunt.
If the threat were real, then the person/persons
behind the threat would be highly professional
and careful. IOW the message would have been injected
from an anon unlinkable node i.e. a cybercafe somewhere,
disgused/gloved etc.
>I'm not suggesting it should be done, just wondering why it
hasn't been
>done (to my knowledge), given the supposed security of
remailers, and the
>nuttiness and criminality of many posters on many usenet groups.
What would a criminal/terror network gain by announcing a future
attack? To warn of an attack would give the authorities a chance
to foil the attack, or at least to evacuate an area. The 9/11
attackers did not announce their plan, nor did the London, Madrid,
Bali bombers.
(The IRA used to phone in a warning with a secret authentication
code an hour before a bomb attack).
| |
| George Orwell 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| George Orwell wrote:
>
> Home users that feel the need to do that are not just paranoid, but
> probably suffering from some sort of paranoid schizophrenia illness.
No, they're probably interested in the subject and think it's neat. That's
why most people take up hobbies.
Now assuming that everyone with a hobby is in some sort of delusional
conspiracy state of mind..... THAT'S the mentality of a paranoid
schizophrenic.
| |
|
| On 2006-04-16, Borked Pseudo Mailed probably said,
[...]
> Combining appeals to patriotism and promises of riches beyond the dreams
> of avarice, with threats of interminable federal investigations of real
> and imagined wrongdoing - that sort of carrot-and-stick must concentrate
> the mind of a CEO wonderfully.
>
> If the government is doing this sort of wholesale sureveillance, it may be
> from the best motives, but I'm not enough of a patriot to want some S.O.B.
> sticking his nose into my computer. If that's what is necessary to keep
> buildings from being brought down by terrorists, then we probably need a
> new government.
Or...
www.openbsd.org
;)
--
http://tinyurl.com/puefx
http://tinyurl.com/zxzmz
| |
|
| On 2006-04-16, Borked Pseudo Mailed probably said,
> ACOG wrote:
>
>
> You have it completely XXX backwards.
Yeah oh?
> A "basic virus" is meant to propagate. Spread from machine to machine. If
> it buggers things up so the machines don't work, how is it going to
> propagate?
If it doesn't propogate, then its not a virus. Dipso fatso.
> The "perfect" virus wouldn't affect machine operation at all. It would
> replicate and spread without causing so much as a hiccup in any place it
> happened to land.
A virus is characterised by the fact it has a negative effect on the
machine it infects. What you describe here is stealth malicious code,
designed to perform its operations covertly. This is beyond the
description of a virus. It is a program, as it is designed to operate
rather than just bugger up operations, as a simple virus would.
> Malicious code, in general, is code that's quite often designed to bugger
> things up horribly. It can be the payload of a virus, a trojanized
> software, spywayre, etc.... but in broad terms "malicious" means
> destructive while "virus" just means replicating.
Oh, looks like I made that point already. ;)
>
> It's interesting to note that most of the people saying it's so easy to
> do, have never actually done it.
Because most folks also know how damn easy it is to track-back and nail
the little squits, and indeed them, should they decide to play.
I know there are those who run across roads and survive, but I ain't
going to be trying that one myself either.
> Finding holes in Windows is no more or less difficult than finding holes
> in any operating system. Exploiting them is an almost identical process
> between the two. the only significant difference is the fact that on
> typical Windows "end user" machines once you've got your foot in the door
> you have the whole house while on *nix boxes you're usually still
> restricted to a great extent.
I'd argue the simplistic idea that "all operating systems are the same
and therefore equally vunerable" and "Exploiting them is an almost
identical process between the two". Its not. Its very very different,
and that difference is magnified significantly with each admin's
security systems.
This view is typically a result of not reading much more than computer
hack journo's badly informed info-tainment whereby the continuing
Swiss-cheese offering from M$, wide open unless specifically blocked
(think about the toll booth in Blazing Saddles), is compared to Linux
security alerts where an extreme situation has been discovered to
generate a theoretical vunerability, but only in circumstances a
dedicated idiot would create in the first place (typically
patched/updated as the report goes to press). The two situations are
nothing like the same, until said hack journo wraps them together to get
a blow job from his boss who just got the latest XP sent for free.
I take your point about the average WinDOHs user's system though.
Now what was that about my "XXX" again?
--
http://tinyurl.com/puefx
http://tinyurl.com/zxzmz
| |
| George Orwell 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| ACOG wrote:
> On 2006-04-16, Borked Pseudo Mailed probably said,
>
> [...]
>
> Or...
>
> www.openbsd.org
So WTF does OpenBSD have to do with the TLA's installing mass data mining
equipment way down the wire at a switching station?
Or is your grasp of operating systems as tin foil beanie as your ideas
about 9/11? You think BSD has telepathic anti-spying powers or something?
Is that your hallucination of the day?
>
> ;)
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| ACOG wrote:
>
> If it doesn't propogate, then its not a virus. Dipso fatso.
You're missing the point entirely, and engaging in semantics games.
If it doesn't propagate widely it's not a successful virus. Virus
"worth" is measured only by the numbers of machines it can infect
undetected. But being a "poor" virus doesn't mean it's not a virus any
more than an automobile that's out of fuel becomes something else. It just
means it's not very good at what it's suppose to do. That's why viruses
are usually designed to NOT mess things up unless and until some criteria
is met and they can deliver a non-viral payload. If they even
intentionally do any damage at all.
>
> A virus is characterised by the fact it has a negative effect on the
> machine it infects.
False. Completely incorrect. A virus is characterized by the fact that it
tries to replicate. Period. By your incorrect definition ANY bit of code
or coding error would be a virus. The bug in your mail reader that made a
message fall into the bit bucket would be a "virus". The display driver
incompatibility that made your UI lock up would be a "virus".
> What you describe here is stealth malicious code,
What I described was a computer virus. They can be "stealth" or not,
intentionally malicious, or inherently benign with any ill effects being
coincidental. The first widely replicating piece of digital history,
technically a "worm" because of it's method of replication, was a game in
fact.
The only thing all computer viruses have in common is replication. You
seem to be operating under some "wive's tale" version of viruses being
inherently evil or having mystical qualities. They're neither.
>
> Oh, looks like I made that point already. ;)
No, you tried, and failed, to make the opposite point. That all malicious
code was a virus. Whether you understand what you're typing or not that's
an incorrect definition.
>
> Because most folks also know how damn easy it is to track-back and nail
> the little squits, and indeed them, should they decide to play.
And what, exactly does being traceable have to do with what operating
system might or might not be more vulnerable?
Absolutely nothing. Misdirection noted.
>
> I'd argue the simplistic idea that "all operating systems are the same and
> therefore equally vunerable" and "Exploiting them is an almost identical
> process between the two". Its not.
Utterly clueless nonsense.
Please explain the inherent difference between a buffer overflow occurring
on a Windows box and one occurring on any box running any other operating
system.
You were aware that the huge majority of OS vulnerabilities fell under
this umbrella, right?
> Its very very different, and that
> difference is magnified significantly with each admin's security systems.
An administrator's "security systems" have nothing at all to do with the
inherent qualities of the underlying operating system.
Straw grab noted.
Here's the facts you apparently aren't aware of:
There's more known vulnerabilities found in an average *nix distribution
that there is in any Windows version during any significant period of time.
Most, if not virtually all significant vulnerabilities, are similar or
identical on all platforms. There's two reasons for this, the most
prominent one being that most vulnerabilities have their roots in hardware
issues.
The process for discovering and testing vulnerabilities under various
operating systems are IDENTICAL.
The ONLY thing that makes Windows vulnerabilities more critical than
vulnerabilities on other platforms is the fact that the lines between
Windows kernel space and user space aren't as well defined as they are by
operating systems that were designed as multi-user from the ground up.
| |
| Antipodean Bucket Farmer 2006-04-18, 12:11 am |
| In article < 4faec2b2d85c1138923019293583b5fb@mixmast
er.it>,
nobody@mixmaster.it says...
[vbcol=seagreen]
> Home users that feel the need to do that are not just paranoid, but
> probably suffering from some sort of paranoid schizophrenia illness.
You mean like home users in China, or some Mulim theocracy (UAE,
etc), where fairly normal, reasonable behaviour and ideas are
illegal?
--
Want Freebies?
http://www.TheFreeStuffList.com/
Check The Free Stuff List
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2006-04-20, 7:05 pm |
| ACOG wrote:
> On 2006-04-17, Borked Pseudo Mailed probably said,
>
> No. I'm repeating what I've said since I responded, and attempting a
You can repeat it as many times as you like, it's still as incorrect as
the first time.
> little bit of humour to avoid drawing attention to your failure to
> recognise it. Plus, you used the "semantics" word, so I win. ;)
And claiming victory doesn't make it yours either.
Cowardly snip acknowledged. There wasn't a single "one liner to be found,
you simply couldn't dispute anything I said. So you slash and burn and
pray it will go away, then substitute the following bit of juvenile
crap in place of any reasonable rebuttal:
[vbcol=seagreen]
> You said something like...
>
> The virus will probably be used concurrently on the computers of many
> people of interest to the LEA community. After the virus has been around
> long enough to do its job, it will suddenly appear 'in the wild', be sent
> to everybody's computer, and anti-virus vendors will devise patches, and
> announcements will be made about the latest East European criminal gang's
> money-stealing scheme.
I said absolutely nothing of the sort. What I did was school you in the
widely accepted definition of a computer virus, acknowledge your pathetic
attempt to obfuscate with "traceability" nonsense, and spotlight some of
the glaring gaps in your knowledge of the technical aspects and history of
operating system vulnerabilities.
>
> and I said something like...
>
> A "virus" as such, in its simplest form, is simply a disruptive and
> destructive thing.
That is a totally false statement. A virus in it's simplest form is
NON-destructive and NON-disruptive. The more "NON" it is, the more
successful it can be. This simple concept is the reasoning behind viruses
using "stealth" techniques and more recently the adaptation of "root kit"
technology to various network worms.
> To deploy *active malicious code* via viral
> infestation routes, and have the target machines run that code, is
> another game altogether,
No, it's the intentionally destructive or disruptive payload that may or
may not be attached to a virus, or any other piece of malware.
As I stated right from the beginning, your entire grasp of the subject is
completely and utterly XXX backwards.
> So, to work with what you've already said, if all a virus does is
> replicate, then all it will do is clog up a user's
> hard-drive/memory/sink_plug_hole/whatever. IOW, bugger things up. Bingo! A
> *simple virus* in operation!
Bloviating nonsense. A successful virus won't "clog up" anything.
Occasionally the mere act of infecting conflicts with some other function,
but that's a rarity and certainly not intentional. In fact virus writers
go to great lengths to make sure it doesn't happen. That's WHY their
viruses are successful.
> If, however, somebody wanted to actually *manipulate* a target machine in
> some way, gain control of something, access some data etc. simply
> buggering up it's processes would not get the job done.
Buggering up IS manipulating.
Accessing data is another matter all together. It requires a compromise.
Either a privilege granting payload to some sort of "viral" code, or a
successful direct attack.
> With me so far?
I was on to you from the beginning. You're confusion is obvious.
> So...
>
> To actually *manipulate* a target machine, we need something that will do
> something *more* than just flood memory etc. We need something that can be
> RUN!
ROTFL!
You think your "simple virus" doesn't run? It's not executable code now?
You're more confused than I thought.
> And this means writing some kind of code with the express intent of
> having it run on the target machine to produce a result other than just
> inconveniencing the user. In fact, as has already been pointed out, it
> would be a "good thing" if the user had no idea our (theoretical) nasty
> little bit of *malicious code* was actually running on their machine.
>
> Still with me?
>
> Ok. So now I've (hopefully, at last) drawn a *clear* distinction between a
> bit of hackery that just sticks a screwdriver in the back of a machine (a
> simple virus) and wiggles it around,
Bzzzzzit..... wrong answer, but thanks for playing. Your "bit of hackery
that just backstabs a machine" would be a Trojan. Completely different
critter. Viruses have very specific characteristics that have already been
outlined for you. In some cases they might include this sort of "back
stabbing" payload, but without the ability to successfully replicate
they're just malicious programs that have to be manually moved from
machine to machine by users. And those are Trojans or Trojanized programs,
my confused friend.
> and a more sophisticated bit of code
> designed to perform a task, and perform it covertly in many cases, ideal
> for the launcher of said (malicious) code.
Now you're back to describing something more along the lines of a virus or
worm. Their sole purpose in life is to surreptitiously move from machine
to machine, and often to "launch" some malicious code or payload upon
encountering a specific trigger.
XXX backwards....
> Now if you STILL don't get the point of what I was saying, and what I was
> NOT saying, then I give up.
I got your point from the very beginning. It's incorrect. You're totally
confused in your understanding of some very basic and widely accepted
tenets of computer security. And a little dishonest in the ways that you
defend your misconceptions.
> Try reading through the thread again, but this time assuming I'm NOT
> trying to have a go at you, but just making a casual side-comment.
I never assumed any such thing. You're simply wrong, and I'm simply
correcting your fallacies for the benefit of the rest of the people
reading these groups. Other than your juvenile revisionism it's not
personal at all, and even that's just an amusing diversion from the real
issues.
> Once more... a "casual side-comment". M'kay?
Casual, fervent..... it's irrelevant. You're posting completely incorrect
information as though you believed you were helping. Bogus information is
never helpful.
> BTW.
> If you think delivering to and running even a simple virus on a *NIX/nux
> box is as simple and easy as with an XP box, we really are on different
> planets. Maybe thats a good thing. 8)
And again that's not what I said. I plainly stated that there's more known
vulnerabilities in the *nix world than there are in the *doze world, and
that the methods of finding and exploiting operating system
vulnerabilities are very similar. But I ALSO plainly stated that the
glaring difference between the two was the ease with which an attacker
could ESCALATE privledge levels on a *doze box.
You were obviously compelled to snip those accurate observations just to
make a feeble attempt at grabbing back a couple credibility points with
more revisionism.
Sorry things didn't work as you expected.....
| |
|
| On 2006-04-19, Borked Pseudo Mailed topped the charts with:
I'm saving this one to read again and again. Its almost a comedy
routine. You may want to apply for intellectual copyright on it. ;)
> ACOG wrote:
>
>
> You can repeat it as many times as you like, it's still as incorrect as
> the first time.
Round and round we go, up and down we go...
>
> And claiming victory doesn't make it yours either.
It - was - a - joke. http://tinyurl.com/lrg2w
>
> Cowardly snip acknowledged. There wasn't a single "one liner to be found,
> you simply couldn't dispute anything I said. So you slash and burn and
> pray it will go away, then substitute the following bit of juvenile
> crap in place of any reasonable rebuttal:
Wiping up after spluttering is the polite thing to do m'boy.
Plus, they were funny. And you didn't read what I snipped from my reply
before posting. You'd have loved those.
>
> I said absolutely nothing of the sort.
You absolutely did. This is the bit of *your* post I responded to.
Quoted as seen. Pasted across. Accurately duplicated. Cloned. Sampled.
The same. Your words exactly. As stored for enternity on usenet.
Or did I dream it? ;)
> What I did was school you
Hang on... laughing... one minute...
....Oh! Thats better! (Wipes eyes.)
> in the
> widely accepted definition of a computer virus, acknowledge your pathetic
> attempt to obfuscate with "traceability" nonsense, and spotlight some of
> the glaring gaps in your knowledge of the technical aspects and history of
> operating system vulnerabilities.
Wandering again. But continue do. This is priceless.
>
> That is a totally false statement. A virus in it's simplest form is
> NON-destructive and NON-disruptive. The more "NON" it is, the more
> successful it can be. This simple concept is the reasoning behind viruses
> using "stealth" techniques and more recently the adaptation of "root kit"
> technology to various network worms.
In other words, *malicious code* designed to *run as a program* with an
intent to perform a TASK rather than just DAMAGE. Oh, I already said
that! Never mind. Continue.
>
> No, it's the intentionally destructive or disruptive payload that may or
> may not be attached to a virus, or any other piece of malware.
Are we getting a little closer now? Warmer! Warmer!
> As I stated right from the beginning, your entire grasp of the subject is
> completely and utterly XXX backwards.
I read that. Thats why I'm treating you as a spluttering fool who got
all spitty when I commented on one detail on your rant about Bulgarians
(or something ;).
>
> Bloviating nonsense. A successful virus won't "clog up" anything.
> Occasionally the mere act of infecting conflicts with some other function,
> but that's a rarity and certainly not intentional. In fact virus writers
> go to great lengths to make sure it doesn't happen. That's WHY their
> viruses are successful.
And not simple "screwdriver" code. As I've been pointing out.
What you describe *here* as a "successful virus" is what I'm calling
"malicious code". What *I'm* refering to as a "simple virus" would be
incapable of performing "tasks" as it is the software equivelent of, as
I've already pointed out, sticking a screwdriver into the back of a
machine and wiggling it about till something goes POP!
You want I should explain that again?
>
> Buggering up IS manipulating.
Not in the differentiating examples and explanations of my point I've
already made clear several times. Its simply "buggering up" which does
nothing more than, "buggering up". NOT "collect and send data" NOT "run
this spyware process" NOT "covertly store nasty porn on corporate
server" etc. just "bugger up" something.
> Accessing data is another matter all together. It requires a compromise.
> Either a privilege granting payload to some sort of "viral" code, or a
> successful direct attack.
Y'mean, malicious code maybe? Gasp! Wish I'd thought of that!
>
> I was on to you from the beginning. You're confusion is obvious.
T'aint me thats confused bud. N'tain't me spluttering in reverse gear
cos ya got called on something either.
Anyway, do continue. This is better than TV.
>
> ROTFL!
>
> You think your "simple virus" doesn't run? It's not executable code now?
>
> You're more confused than I thought.
No. You're compounding your splutterings and avoiding the point I made.
You wanna go down to 1st grade? Ok, but just for a moment.
If I enter the sequence "123GO" at a command prompt, sod all will
happen.
This is simply junk input, and my machine will ignore it.
If I enter something that qualifies as an instruction to my machine, it
will respond and try to carry out that instruction.
If somebody else manages to get some kind of sequence loaded into my
machine that makes it carry out an instruction set, and that action
buggers up the functions of my machine, then all they have managed to do
is infect it with something nasty. This we call a "virus". Coz a machine
is "infected" with it, and it doesn't do it a lot of good. M-kay?
NOW!!!
If that somebody wants to do something other than just cause me a
problem for the day, then, using the same possible routes into my
machine as the script-kiddy did to plant that *simple virus*, somebody
with *malicious intent* can load up a chunk of code that will do MORE
than just snarl things up for me. It will actually PERFORM SPECIFIC
TASKS and FUNCTIONS, just like a PROGRAM. The better it is, the less it
will advertise it's presence, and the more control it will provide to
that somebody that planted it on my machine.
While you are correct in considering this malicious code as a FORM of
computer virus, what I've been drawing your attention to all along is
that a DISTINCION is required between a SIMPLE VIRUS and the more
advanced MALICIOUS CODE that performs tasks way beyond the mess a simple
virus is only capable of. (Something Hollywood also has a problem
conceptualising, so I'll forgive you for missing my point yet again.)
A logical comparison at this point would be to think of the difference
between a cold virus in humans, and some kind of nano-tech that acts
LIKE a virus, is typically designed and built to EMULATE a virus, but
is designed to carry out specific sophisticated tasks rather than just
mess up a system.
>
> Bzzzzzit..... wrong answer, but thanks for playing.
Hmmm. What was that phrase you used? "bit of juvenile crap" yes?
How low d'you want to go here?
> Your "bit of hackery
> that just backstabs a machine" would be a Trojan. Completely different
> critter. Viruses have very specific characteristics that have already been
> outlined for you. In some cases they might include this sort of "back
> stabbing" payload, but without the ability to successfully replicate
> they're just malicious programs that have to be manually moved from
> machine to machine by users. And those are Trojans or Trojanized programs,
> my confused friend.
Not what I was talking about at all. You're going to have to pay more
attention if you want to pass this semester.
>
> Now you're back to describing something more along the lines of a virus or
> worm. Their sole purpose in life is to surreptitiously move from machine
> to machine, and often to "launch" some malicious code or payload upon
> encountering a specific trigger.
No. You're interpreting the collective bulk of your own
misunderstandings as such.
> XXX backwards....
I was thinking the same thing. ;)
>
> I got your point from the very beginning. It's incorrect.
Therefore, you didn't get my point. You covered the flaw in the point I
was responding to in your post with this ever expanding
counter-spluttering.
But do continue.
> You're totally
> confused in your understanding of some very basic and widely accepted
> tenets of computer security. And a little dishonest in the ways that you
> defend your misconceptions.
Again, I was thinking pretty much the same thing about you.
Constant attempts to gain a reaction by personal accusations noted BTW. ;)
>
> I never assumed any such thing. You're simply wrong, and I'm simply
> correcting your fallacies for the benefit of the rest of the people
> reading these groups. Other than your juvenile revisionism it's not
> personal at all, and even that's just an amusing diversion from the real
> issues.
Ooh! Camp or what! Snip Snap!
You have learned your spluttering well young Luke!
>
> Casual, fervent..... it's irrelevant. You're posting completely incorrect
> information as though you believed you were helping. Bogus information is
> never helpful.
Which is something like what I was thinking when I read your post,
featuring the quote you disclaimed, that I responded to. Or were you
just confused? ;)
You've ascribed all kinds of thing to me that I didn't say, wasn't
saying, and don't even think. At least half of your arguing here is with
your own projected ideas, not with what I was attempting to discuss in a
single casual comment.
Which kinda covers the "bogus" bit I guess. ;)
>
> And again that's not what I said. I plainly stated that there's more known
> vulnerabilities in the *nix world than there are in the *doze world, and
> that the methods of finding and exploiting operating system
> vulnerabilities are very similar. But I ALSO plainly stated that the
> glaring difference between the two was the ease with which an attacker
> could ESCALATE privledge levels on a *doze box.
You didn't say that. You "plainly stated" this...
The ONLY thing that makes Windows vulnerabilities more critical
than vulnerabilities on other platforms is the fact that the
lines between Windows kernel space and user space aren't as well
defined as they are by operating systems that were designed as
multi-user from the ground up.
Which is not the same thing. Though you do get a few points for it.
> You were obviously compelled to snip those accurate observations just to
> make a feeble attempt at grabbing back a couple credibility points with
> more revisionism.
Didn't need to snip. Just trying to get the post size down to something
readable by removing spurious space filler stuff. And I don't need
"credibility points" at this time as I'm the one asking YOU about
something YOU said. Or at least I was before all this got fired up.
But do continue.
> Sorry things didn't work as you expected.....
I expected just what I've got from you from your first defiant response
to my first comment. I had hoped a discourse would develop, but this
amusing game will suffice. Anyhow, I'm sure you're as bored with it as I
am now, and as it appears you cross-posted to alt.conspiracy as an
afterthought, which suggests you needed to drag a few extras into
whatever you were pontificating about on alt.privacy and
alt.privacy.anon-server to gain an advantage in that thread. Or not.
And you got me. Tough.
As I've got other things to do with my limited time on the planet now,
I'm going to add those two newsgroups (which I'm not that interested in)
to my =-9999 scorelist, so if you want to continue, do it here on
alt.conspiracy, and I might be tempted. Or not.
'S been fun. C-ya.
(Hope your blood pressure returns to normal soon BTW.)
--
http://tinyurl.com/puefx
http://tinyurl.com/zxzmz
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