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Home > Archive > Anonymous Servers > July 2007 > Komite nymserver end of life.
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Komite nymserver end of life.
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| Laurent Fousse 2007-07-16, 7:13 am |
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Hash: SHA1
Hello,
The Komite nymserver will cease all operations no later than august
31st. New nym creations are already no longer possible, and users are
advised to migrate elsewhere as soon as possible.
Regards,
The Komite nymop.
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| Anonymous 2007-07-18, 1:13 pm |
| > Hello,
>
> The Komite nymserver will cease all operations no later than august
> 31st. New nym creations are already no longer possible, and users are
> advised to migrate elsewhere as soon as possible.
>
> Regards,
>
> The Komite nymop.
Thanks for letting us know. May I ask why you decided to close it?
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| Thomas J. Boschloo 2007-07-19, 1:13 pm |
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Anonymous schreef:
>
> Thanks for letting us know. May I ask why you decided to close it?
Because it is end of life??
Maybe an experimental mixminion server will take its place. Who knows!
Thomas
- --
I am the M-1
I kill for fun
I kill
for Thrill
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| Laurent Fousse 2007-07-19, 7:13 pm |
| On 18 juil, 18:35, Anonymous <cri...@ecn.org> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Thanks for letting us know. May I ask why you decided to close it?
As I plan to replace this computer with a new low profile machine, it
was a perfect opportunity to acknowledge the fact that type I
nymserver is broken, as are basically all reply-blocks based
nymservers (yes, including type III according to
http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/p...article-620.pdf section
4.2).
| |
| Cyberiade.it Anonymous Remailer 2007-07-20, 1:13 pm |
| Laurent Fousse <lfousse@gmail.com> wrote:
> As I plan to replace this computer with a new low profile machine, it
> was a perfect opportunity to acknowledge the fact that type I
> nymserver is broken, as are basically all reply-blocks based
> nymservers (yes, including type III according to
> http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/p...article-620.pdf section
> 4.2).
Since more secure alternatives aren't available, even type I
nymservers seem to be an acceptable solution unless the replyblock
contains the nymholder's address. IMHO it's the user who has to decide
whether he can accept the well-known weaknesses of a nymserver for the
intended job.
Many thanks for your service.
..
| |
| Thomas J. Boschloo 2007-07-20, 7:14 pm |
| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Cyberiade.it Anonymous Remailer schreef:
> Laurent Fousse <lfousse@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Since more secure alternatives aren't available, even type I
> nymservers seem to be an acceptable solution unless the replyblock
> contains the nymholder's address. IMHO it's the user who has to decide
> whether he can accept the well-known weaknesses of a nymserver for the
> intended job.
But it is for the remop to decide if he can get the user the level of
security he wants to protect against. I played with the idea of running
a mixmaster remailer earlier this year, but that involved running a mail
service on the same machine. Something I don't think I am capable of
(yet) and something that is not as secure as I would like the remailer I
envision running to be.
Not every potential remop uses the threat model of Eelbash Admin (if it
produces output given a certain input then it must be secure)
Thomas
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| |
| Cyberiade.it Anonymous Remailer 2007-07-20, 7:14 pm |
| In article < 92e2a9ebd011a7e4be0eb59c6e149814@remaile
r.cyberiade.it>
Cyberiade.it Anonymous Remailer <anonymous@remailer.cyberiade.it> wrote:
>
>
> Laurent Fousse <lfousse@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> Since more secure alternatives aren't available, even type I
> nymservers seem to be an acceptable solution unless the replyblock
> contains the nymholder's address. IMHO it's the user who has to decide
> whether he can accept the well-known weaknesses of a nymserver for the
> intended job.
>
> Many thanks for your service.
> .
If I understood it right, according to section 4.2 a nym can be "statistically broken" when it is used frequently enough. I am not sure someone in dire need of security would keep the same nym for too long or wouldn't use a newsgroup as an exit point (whi
ch I think is possible?)
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| StealthMonger 2007-07-21, 1:16 am |
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Laurent Fousse <lfousse@gmail.com> writes:
> As I plan to replace this computer with a new low profile machine, it
> was a perfect opportunity to acknowledge the fact that type I
> nymserver is broken, as are basically all reply-blocks based
> nymservers (yes, including type III according to
> http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/p...article-620.pdf section
> 4.2).
Nym reply blocks should post replies to alt.anonymous.messages to
avoid these problems. The user then selects her replies from among
the posted articles and ignores the rest. She takes a full feed of
a.a.m at all times without interruption and does the selection on her
own machine out of public view, so nobody sees which she selects.
Every user interested in privacy should be taking a full feed of
newsgroup alt.anonymous.messages at all times without interruption.
It has uses other than nym reply blocks, such as stealthmail.
-- StealthMonger
<StealthMonger@nym.alias.net>
<StealthMonger@hod.aarg.net>
<StealthMonger@nym.panta-rhei.eu.org>
--
stealthmail: Scripts to hide whether you're doing email, or when,
or with whom. http://stealthsuite.afflictions.org
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| Thomas J. Boschloo 2007-07-23, 7:13 am |
| -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Cyberiade.it Anonymous Remailer schreef:
> In article < 92e2a9ebd011a7e4be0eb59c6e149814@remaile
r.cyberiade.it>
> Cyberiade.it Anonymous Remailer <anonymous@remailer.cyberiade.it> wrote:
>
> If I understood it right, according to section 4.2 a nym can be "statistically broken" when it is used frequently enough. I am not sure someone in dire need of security would keep the same nym for too long or wouldn't use a newsgroup as an exit point (w
hich I think is possible?)
The problem as I understand it is that you cannot control how much mail
your nym gets.
What is worse, your reply block unwraps as a gift revealing your e-mail
address (unless you drop to aam). Once you put your reply block at the
nym server of your choice, you cannot put it back into the bottle. And
cypherpunk keys aren't changed that often :-(
Thomas
- --
"Every time a car horn blows, an angel gets it's wings"
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| |
| Julius Caesar 2007-07-26, 1:13 pm |
| lfousse@gmail.com (Laurent Fousse) wrote:
> was a perfect opportunity to acknowledge the fact that type I
> nymserver is broken, as are basically all reply-blocks based
> nymservers (yes, including type III according to
> http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/p...article-620.pdf section
> 4.2).
Am I right, that this is only important, when an adversary knows
the real
email-address and needs a confirmation?
| |
| Brutus 2007-07-26, 7:13 pm |
| Salve!
Julius Caesar <caesar@roma.invalid> wrote:
>lfousse@gmail.com (Laurent Fousse) wrote:
>
>
>Am I right, that this is only important, when an adversary knows
>the real
>email-address and needs a confirmation?
Considering the short cypherpunk remailer keys and their long-term
usage, including your mail address in a reply block may make you lose
the game without even one reply having to be received. And if they
currently aren't able to decode the data they may preserve them until
they are.
That's different with reply blocks ending at a newsgroup. If you
always download all available messages, e.g. by using a local proxy
server, and there are enough others who do just the same, an adversary
has a hard time. Even if he succeeds in decrypting messages he won't
find a connection with the nym holder. That's why I assume a.a.m
deliveries to be a relatively safe bet.
Brutus
| |
| Borked Pseudo Mailed 2007-07-28, 7:13 pm |
| On 20 Jul 2007, Cyberiade.it Anonymous Remailer
<anonymous@remailer.cyberiade.it> wrote:
>In article < 92e2a9ebd011a7e4be0eb59c6e149814@remaile
r.cyberiade.it>
>Cyberiade.it Anonymous Remailer <anonymous@remailer.cyberiade.it> wrote:
>
>If I understood it right, according to section 4.2 a nym can be
>"statistically broken" when it is used frequently enough. I am not sure
>someone in dire need of security would keep the same nym for too long or
>wouldn't use a newsgroup as an exit point (which I think is possible?)
Statistically breaking can be made more difficult by changing reply blocks
reasonably often, NEVER using an email address as a reply block termination
and always downloading ALL messages in AAM.
You can help confuse things further by running a private remailer and using
it as a start of 3 to 5 chains 5 or 10 hops long with enough dummy traffic
to cover your real mailings.
That's what I've been doing for years.
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