Message 1:

> 'A new federal law states that when you annoy someone on the Internet,
> you must disclose your identity. Here's the relevant language.
>
> '"Whoever...utilizes any device or software that can be used to
> originate telecommunications or other types of communications that are
> transmitted, in whole or in part, by the Internet... without disclosing
> his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass any
> person...who receives the communications...shall be fined under title 18
> or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."

The person who wrote the above quote made liberal usage of ellipses
that made this bill sound much worse than it really is.  It forgot to
mention that it only applies to anonymous OBSCENE AND LEWD
communications, so it won't apply to just annoying blog commentaries or
most other speech.  It also forgets to mention that these types of
communication are ALREADY banned via the telephone and other
communication devices.  The only thing that has changed, is that
internet telephony and communication has been added (to protect people
from receiving anonymous phone calls via the internet).

This bill just updated the 1934 Communications Decency Act so that it
now includes Internet devices along with other telephony communication
devices.  The main reason this was necessary was to make sure that the
existing laws against stalking via the telephone were also applicable
to people who used only internet telephones to harass, annoy or
intimidate another person in a manner that is obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, or indecent.

Nothing much has really changed.

The only people that are affected by the new change in the law must
meet ALL OF THESE these criteria:

1) They must INITIATE a communication that is obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, or indecent; and
2) The intent of the communication must be to annoy, abuse, threaten,
or harass another person; and
3) The person must be using the Internet to relay in whole or in part a
message or communication from a telecommunications device.

The only thing that is different between the old and new law is
criteria three, which has added a penalty for people that initiate
obscene anonymous phone calls (or communications) using the Internet.

For further study, here is a link to the latest 1934 Communications and
decency act:

http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf

Here is an excerpt of the relevant section that was amended by the new
law:

------begin section 223 of 1934 Comm. Dec. Act

SEC. 223. [47 U.S.C. 223] OBSCENE OR HARASSING TELEPHONE CALLS IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OR IN INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.
(a) Whoever--
(1) in interstate or foreign communications--
(A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly--
(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or
indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another
person;

-----------end of Sec 223 of 1934CDA-------

The following text is the relevant text from the new law that amended
the above 1934 CDA so that internet communications are now included.
The following excerpt is available in full form from:

http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query...p/~c109FlMPzP::


--------------begin HR 3402 Section 113--------

SEC. 113. PREVENTING CYBERSTALKING.

(a) IN GENERAL.-Paragraph (1) of section 223(h) of the Communications
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 223(h)(1)) is amended-

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ''and'' at the end;

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the
end and inserting ''; and''; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
''(C) in the case of subparagraph (C) of subsection
(a)(1), includes any device or software that can be used
to originate telecommunications or other types of communications
that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by
the Internet (as such term is defined in section 1104 of
the Internet Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note)).''.

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-This section and the amendment
made by this section may not be construed to affect the meaning
given the term ''telecommunications device'' in section
223(h)(1)
of the Communications Act of 1934, as in effect before the date
of the enactment of this section.

--------------end HR 3402 Section 113--------



Message 2:


Simkatu wrote:

> The only thing that is different between the old and new law is
> criteria three, which has added a penalty for people that initiate
> obscene anonymous phone calls (or communications) using the Internet.

I forgot to mention that the US Supreme Court has already protected
anonymous communications in previous rulings, including anonymous
ANNOYING messages on internet web pages and discussion boards.

The EFF has this to say about it:

It is well established that the First Amendment protects the right to
speak anonymously. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld this right.
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 645-646
(1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley
v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). These cases have celebrated the
important role played by anonymous or pseudonymous writings over the
course of history, from the literary efforts of William Shakespeare and
Mark Twain through the authors of the Federalist Papers. As the Supreme
Court said in McIntyre,

[A]n author is generally free to decide whether or not to disclose his
or her true identity. The decision in favor of anonymity may be
motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about
social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's
privacy as possible. Whatever the motivation may be, . . . the interest
in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably
outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of
entry. Accordingly, an author's decision to remain anonymous, like
other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a
publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the
First Amendment.
* * *
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious,
fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of
dissent.

McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-342, 357 (footnote omitted).

These rights are fully applicable to speech on the Internet. The
Supreme Court has treated the Internet as a fully protected medium for
public discourse, which places in the hands of any individual who wants
to express his views the opportunity, at least in theory, to reach
other members of the public hundreds or even thousands of miles away,
at virtually no cost; consequently, the Court has held that First
Amendment protections are fully applicable to communications over the
Internet. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Several lower court decisions have further upheld the right to
communicate anonymously over the Internet. ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F.
Supp.2d 1029, 1033 (D.N.M. 1998), aff'd, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir.
1999); ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1230, 1232-1233 (N.D. Ga.
1997); see also ApolloMEDIA Corp. v. Reno, 119 S. Ct. 1450 (1999),
aff'g 19 F. Supp.2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (protecting anonymous
denizens of web site at www.annoy.com, a site "created and designed to
annoy" legislators through anonymous communications).

[...]

The Supreme Court has held that a court order to compel production of
individuals' identities in a situation that would threaten the exercise
of fundamental rights "is subject to the closest scrutiny." NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958); Bates v City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516, 524 (1960). It has acknowledged that abridgement of the
rights to speech and press, "even though unintended, may inevitably
follow from varied forms of governmental action," such as compelling
the production of names. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 461. The Court
noted that rights may be curtailed by means of private retribution
following such court-ordered disclosures. Id. at 462-463; Bates, 361
U.S. at 524. The novelty of the procedural requirements at issue cannot
be used to thwart consideration of the constitutional issues involved.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 457. Due process requires the showing of
a "subordinating interest which is compelling" where, as here,
compelled disclosure threatens to impair significantly fundamental
rights. Bates, 361 U.S. at 524; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 463.

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]

HEY!, your post annoys me.....identify yourself immediately!




"George Orwell" <nobody@mixmaster.it> wrote in message
 news:6b3606ef797519002b9de039031ce745@mi
xmaster.it...
> Message 1:
> 
>
> The person who wrote the above quote made liberal usage of ellipses
> that made this bill sound much worse than it really is.  It forgot to
> mention that it only applies to anonymous OBSCENE AND LEWD
> communications, so it won't apply to just annoying blog commentaries or
> most other speech.  It also forgets to mention that these types of
> communication are ALREADY banned via the telephone and other
> communication devices.  The only thing that has changed, is that
> internet telephony and communication has been added (to protect people
> from receiving anonymous phone calls via the internet).
>
> This bill just updated the 1934 Communications Decency Act so that it
> now includes Internet devices along with other telephony communication
> devices.  The main reason this was necessary was to make sure that the
> existing laws against stalking via the telephone were also applicable
> to people who used only internet telephones to harass, annoy or
> intimidate another person in a manner that is obscene, lewd,
> lascivious, filthy, or indecent.
>
> Nothing much has really changed.
>
> The only people that are affected by the new change in the law must
> meet ALL OF THESE these criteria:
>
> 1) They must INITIATE a communication that is obscene, lewd,
> lascivious, filthy, or indecent; and
> 2) The intent of the communication must be to annoy, abuse, threaten,
> or harass another person; and
> 3) The person must be using the Internet to relay in whole or in part a
> message or communication from a telecommunications device.
>
> The only thing that is different between the old and new law is
> criteria three, which has added a penalty for people that initiate
> obscene anonymous phone calls (or communications) using the Internet.
>
> For further study, here is a link to the latest 1934 Communications and
> decency act:
>
> http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf
>
> Here is an excerpt of the relevant section that was amended by the new
> law:
>
> ------begin section 223 of 1934 Comm. Dec. Act
>
> SEC. 223. [47 U.S.C. 223] OBSCENE OR HARASSING TELEPHONE CALLS IN THE
> DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OR IN INTERSTATE OR FOREIGN COMMUNICATIONS.
> (a) Whoever--
> (1) in interstate or foreign communications--
> (A) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly--
> (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
> (ii) initiates the transmission of,
> any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or
> other communication which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or
> indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another
> person;
>
> -----------end of Sec 223 of 1934CDA-------
>
> The following text is the relevant text from the new law that amended
> the above 1934 CDA so that internet communications are now included.
> The following excerpt is available in full form from:
>
> http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query...p/~c109FlMPzP::
>
>
> --------------begin HR 3402 Section 113--------
>
> SEC. 113. PREVENTING CYBERSTALKING.
>
> (a) IN GENERAL.-Paragraph (1) of section 223(h) of the Communications
> Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 223(h)(1)) is amended-
>
> (1) in subparagraph (A), by striking ''and'' at the end;
>
> (2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the
> end and inserting ''; and''; and
>
> (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
> ''(C) in the case of subparagraph (C) of subsection
> (a)(1), includes any device or software that can be used
> to originate telecommunications or other types of communications
> that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by
> the Internet (as such term is defined in section 1104 of
> the Internet Tax Freedom Act (47 U.S.C. 151 note)).''.
>
> (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-This section and the amendment
> made by this section may not be construed to affect the meaning
> given the term ''telecommunications device'' in section
> 223(h)(1)
> of the Communications Act of 1934, as in effect before the date
> of the enactment of this section.
>
> --------------end HR 3402 Section 113--------
>
>
>
> Message 2:
>
>
> Simkatu wrote:
> 
>
> I forgot to mention that the US Supreme Court has already protected
> anonymous communications in previous rulings, including anonymous
> ANNOYING messages on internet web pages and discussion boards.
>
> The EFF has this to say about it:
>
> It is well established that the First Amendment protects the right to
> speak anonymously. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld this right.
> Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., 119 S. Ct. 636, 645-646
> (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley
> v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). These cases have celebrated the
> important role played by anonymous or pseudonymous writings over the
> course of history, from the literary efforts of William Shakespeare and
> Mark Twain through the authors of the Federalist Papers. As the Supreme
> Court said in McIntyre,
>
> [A]n author is generally free to decide whether or not to disclose his
> or her true identity. The decision in favor of anonymity may be
> motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about
> social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's
> privacy as possible. Whatever the motivation may be, . . . the interest
> in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas unquestionably
> outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of
> entry. Accordingly, an author's decision to remain anonymous, like
> other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a
> publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the
> First Amendment.
> * * *
> Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious,
> fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of
> dissent.
>
> McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-342, 357 (footnote omitted).
>
> These rights are fully applicable to speech on the Internet. The
> Supreme Court has treated the Internet as a fully protected medium for
> public discourse, which places in the hands of any individual who wants
> to express his views the opportunity, at least in theory, to reach
> other members of the public hundreds or even thousands of miles away,
> at virtually no cost; consequently, the Court has held that First
> Amendment protections are fully applicable to communications over the
> Internet. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
> Several lower court decisions have further upheld the right to
> communicate anonymously over the Internet. ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F.
> Supp.2d 1029, 1033 (D.N.M. 1998), aff'd, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir.
> 1999); ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1230, 1232-1233 (N.D. Ga.
> 1997); see also ApolloMEDIA Corp. v. Reno, 119 S. Ct. 1450 (1999),
> aff'g 19 F. Supp.2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (protecting anonymous
> denizens of web site at www.annoy.com, a site "created and designed to
> annoy" legislators through anonymous communications).
>
> [...]
>
> The Supreme Court has held that a court order to compel production of
> individuals' identities in a situation that would threaten the exercise
> of fundamental rights "is subject to the closest scrutiny." NAACP v.
> Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958); Bates v City of Little Rock, 361
> U.S. 516, 524 (1960). It has acknowledged that abridgement of the
> rights to speech and press, "even though unintended, may inevitably
> follow from varied forms of governmental action," such as compelling
> the production of names. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 461. The Court
> noted that rights may be curtailed by means of private retribution
> following such court-ordered disclosures. Id. at 462-463; Bates, 361
> U.S. at 524. The novelty of the procedural requirements at issue cannot
> be used to thwart consideration of the constitutional issues involved.
> NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 457. Due process requires the showing of
> a "subordinating interest which is compelling" where, as here,
> compelled disclosure threatens to impair significantly fundamental
> rights. Bates, 361 U.S. at 524; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 463.
>

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In article <CqGdnQ_LxtoFmVjeRVn-qQ@comcast.com>
"John Smith" <me@myhouse.com> wrote:
>
> HEY!, your post annoys me.....identify yourself immediately!

;)

That is of course the reason why this law is unworkable. If it's
illegal to annoy someone anonymously, you have to find out who
that person is to prosecute them. But of course you can't, as it
was done anonymously. Catch 22.

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]