In OmniMix v.1.2.2 Uno, under the 'Anon Mail S' tab, the default host is
listed as 'mail.bananasplit.info' on Port 2525, with a remailer name of
'banana'.

Are there other entries that can be put into this tab? If so, how do we
figure out what the host, port and remailer name of these are?

As a feature request, if there are additional servers that can be used on
that tab, can I request that the OmniMix author create the same sort of
interface as is on the 'Anon' tab, under Remailer >> News, and Remailer >>
Mail (the '...' buttons), including a '0' (random) option?

Thanks

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]

To Christian:
Why not make a simple to use install, similar to QS, for the benefit of all 
of
us who are not as computer-savvy as you?

TIA

On Mon, 18 Jun 2007 22:40:02 +0200 (CEST), Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com>
wrote:

>In OmniMix v.1.2.2 Uno, under the 'Anon Mail S' tab, the default host is
>listed as 'mail.bananasplit.info' on Port 2525, with a remailer name of
>'banana'.

>Are there other entries that can be put into this tab? If so, how do we
>figure out what the host, port and remailer name of these are?

>As a feature request, if there are additional servers that can be used on
>that tab, can I request that the OmniMix author create the same sort of
>interface as is on the 'Anon' tab, under Remailer >> News, and Remailer >>
>Mail (the '...' buttons), including a '0' (random) option?

>Thanks

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]

Hi Jules!

Jules Striker wrote:

>Why not make a simple to use install, similar to QS, for the benefit of all
 of
>us who are not as computer-savvy as you?

Are you aware that meanwhile the complete OmniMix system (including
Mixmaster, GnuPG and Tor) is shipped in the form of a single setup
file?

With a double click and 10 single mouse clicks you're able to install
the whole system. 7 further clicks and your first dummy mail is sent:

- 'Use 'Anon Mail S Host'' checkbox to bypass the mail host config
- 'Start' button to restart the servers with that changed parameter
- 'State Ext' tab
- 'Update State Data' button to get current remailer statistics
- 'Misc' tab
- 'Dummy' tab
- 'Send Dummy Message' button to test the anon mail output

Of course an individual configuration is a bit more complex.

Or do you have something different on your mind?

Kind regards

Christian
--
OmniMix .. protect your privacy
http://www.danner-net.de/om.htm

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]

Hi!

>In OmniMix v.1.2.2 Uno, under the 'Anon Mail S' tab, the default host is
>listed as 'mail.bananasplit.info' on Port 2525, with a remailer name of
>'banana'.

The bananasplit mail host like all other remailer associated SMTP
hosts is restricted to delivering mail to nothing but its own
remailer, which is why OmniMix is able to modify the remailer chain
accordingly.

>Are there other entries that can be put into this tab? If so, how do we
>figure out what the host, port and remailer name of these are?

Of course there are other options. http://www.noreply.org/tls lists
the access data of remailer related SMTP servers. But be prepared, at
first sight it's a bit confusing.

>As a feature request, if there are additional servers that can be used on
>that tab, can I request that the OmniMix author create the same sort of
>interface as is on the 'Anon' tab, under Remailer >> News, and Remailer >>
>Mail (the '...' buttons), including a '0' (random) option?

As the data provided by Noreply not always guarantee a reliable
connection, you still have to do some testing on your own, which is
why an automated parsing of that list done by OmniMix or, going beyond
that, a random selection of the SMTP server would be no good. Besides,
you may be interested in using hidden services as well, so that you
have to make sure that Tor is running, which takes a few seconds to be
available after starting it. To sum it up, such an automatism would
jeopardize reliability.

The question is what you're trying to accomplish. There usually is no
reason for a frequent alteration of the entry point. One reliable
gateway is sufficient, the access data of a second one at hand for
backup reasons. If you need more security then route the connection
through Tor or simply add another ramdom remailer.

The only way to make the manual switching between (anon) SMTP hosts
more comfortable would be an additional list like the User Account or
Hashcash list including all items of the '(Anon) Mail S' tab. But
that's already on my to-do list. I'm not sure whether this will be
realized before or after the migration to a data storage in XML
format.

Kind regards

Christian
--
OmniMix .. protect your privacy
http://www.danner-net.de/om.htm

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]

In article <1b9773e95aeae1a5467fdcc36ee47635@pseudo.borked.net>
Christian Danner <---@---.---> wrote:
>

Hi Christian. Every post made with Omnimix results in:
X-Invalid: ##
being in the headers of the post or email. This unfortunately
partitions all users of Omnimix from users of the more popular
QS and JBN2 users. As anonymity in the remailer network relies
on hiding amongst other users, anything that reduces the amount
of users to hide in isn't good.

Can you remove this? Its in the headers of every poster in here
that uses Omnimix, and your posts too. As there is no source code
I can't see exactly why its happening, but I am assuming that you
aren't using the '##' body headers syntax properly and are instead
adding it in the headers instead of the body?

Sorry for my bad english.

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]

Hi!

>Hi Christian. Every post made with Omnimix results in:
>X-Invalid: ##
>being in the headers of the post or email. This unfortunately
>partitions all users of Omnimix from users of the more popular
>QS and JBN2 users. As anonymity in the remailer network relies
>on hiding amongst other users, anything that reduces the amount
>of users to hide in isn't good.

Good heavens! You're absolutely right. Many thanks for that important
hint.

>Can you remove this? Its in the headers of every poster in here
>that uses Omnimix, and your posts too.

AFAICS it began with version 0.9.8.0, where I changed from Mixmaster
2.0 to 2.9. I'm not aware of any different syntax requirement or
tolerance of irregularities, but will look what can be done. As a
first step with this message I removed the introducing '##' line
without replacement.

> As there is no source code
>I can't see exactly why its happening, but I am assuming that you
>aren't using the '##' body headers syntax properly and are instead
>adding it in the headers instead of the body?

Nothing mysterious. The 'Log' list tells you the parameters of the
Mixmaster call:

14:10:59.686 0 Calling Mixmaster (parameters: ' -m -c 4 -l
banana,*,*,borked om\0.mxt') ...

which means

mix.exe -m -c 4 -l banana,*,*,borked om\0.mxt

and the 'Raw Data' list shows the text transferred with the message
file 0.mxt:

------------------------------------------------------------
##
From: Christian Danner <---@---.--->
To: mail2news@dizum.com, mail2news@m2n.mixmin.net
Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server
References: <782dff81b0e640b236b915e4e94b98a3@dizum.com>
<p9td73t6vqoook7hqvhmeu31hvha1ceon5@4ax.com>
<1b9773e95aeae1a5467fdcc36ee47635@pseudo.borked.net>
<f2d763cdbaa186a29f17a58a61d64212@pseudo.borked.net>
Subject: Re: OmniMix v.1.2.2 Uno - Anon Mail S - additional Hosts and
settings?
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

Hi!

>Hi Christian. Every post made with Omnimix results in:

<snip>

OmniMix .. protect your privacy
http://www.danner-net.de/om.htm
.
------------------------------------------------------------

>Sorry for my bad english.

As we all non-natives are about our command of English. ;-)

Kind regards

Christian
--
OmniMix .. protect your privacy
http://www.danner-net.de/om.htm

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]

Christian Danner wrote:

> The question is what you're trying to accomplish. There usually is no
> reason for a frequent alteration of the entry point. One reliable
> gateway is sufficient, the access data of a second one at hand for

Nonsense. Mixmaster is designed to use random entry points for a reason,
and restricting your entry node to a single remailer completely defeats
it. It opens you up to easy traffic analysis.

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512

On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 16:45:09 +0200 (CEST), George Orwell wrote in
Message-Id: < a38d060904c1f23c6068ec2956c9dc91@mixmast
er.it>:

> Nonsense. Mixmaster is designed to use random entry points for a reason,
> and restricting your entry node to a single remailer completely defeats
> it. It opens you up to easy traffic analysis.

Interesting.  Can you expand on this please?
As Mixmaster traffic is easily identified, it would appear not to matter
whether you send it to one remailer or many.  Hardcoding the exit could
potentially reveal information, but I don't see how the entry does.

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--
pub  1024D/8ED57743 2003-07-08 Bananasplit Operator
Key fingerprint = 796F 67E0 E890 A0BB BDAE  EBB4 94A6 7A09 8ED5 7743
uid                            Admin <admin.bananasplit.info>

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]

Zax wrote:

> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA512
>
> On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 16:45:09 +0200 (CEST), George Orwell wrote in
> Message-Id: < a38d060904c1f23c6068ec2956c9dc91@mixmast
er.it>:
> 
>
> Interesting.  Can you expand on this please?
> As Mixmaster traffic is easily identified, it would appear not to matter
> whether you send it to one remailer or many.  Hardcoding the exit could
> potentially reveal information, but I don't see how the entry does.

If you're hard coding a consistent entry node that node knows about all
traffic you're sending. Assuming they're able to see exit traffic,
such as posts to a newsgroup, that node can collate the number and times
of messages with the the number and times that posts reach Usenet. That
alone could be enough to out users under some circumstances, and combined
with some of the other things that partition you like SMTP negotiations,
header order, different "features" of various clients, etc., the chances
that a remailer operator could divine your real identity increase
dramatically.

It may not work so well with privately delivered messages, but how could
hard coding a "permanent" entry node not be considered diminished
security in any case? Obfuscating and spreading knowledge of your activity
is tantamount to Mixmaster's design. Not only are random entry points
chosen to keep one operator from knowing about all traffic, if you use
multiple chains with the 'copies' directive a random selection is used for
each message, which further obfuscates activity by effectively making the
message that appears at the other end even more random in nature as far as
latency and traffic analysis goes.

Knowledge of injected traffic absolutely is valuable. It's the reason
random node selection and dummy traffic generation exist. Or would you
suggest that these things are themselves nothing but the random whims of
Mixmaster's developers? ;-)

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]

On Tue, 19 Jun 2007 19:31:09 +0200 (CEST), George Orwell wrote in
Message-Id: < 0693262209894b2d871236a8ccc848a0@mixmast
er.it>:

> If you're hard coding a consistent entry node that node knows about all
> traffic you're sending.

I see your point.  Rather than just seeing some entry traffic, the entry
node now knows all of it.  In effect the operator has the ability to
correlate entry traffic with a common destination such as a.a.m.
Conversely, from the point of view of the theoretical 'Global
Adversary', it makes little difference as we assume they can see all
this traffic anyway.

> Knowledge of injected traffic absolutely is valuable. It's the reason
> random node selection and dummy traffic generation exist. Or would you
> suggest that these things are themselves nothing but the random whims of
> Mixmaster's developers? ;-)

No, I agree with you, random entry points are a good thing.  Sometimes I
think we lean too far towards theoretical attacks and global adversaries
and don't focus enough on the simple things like snooping operators (of
one or multiple remailers).  I still think the best defence in virtually
all cases is to run your own public remailer node.  This is the instance
where hard-coding the entry point is certainly a good thing.  

--
pub  1024D/8ED57743 2003-07-08 Bananasplit Operator
Key fingerprint = 796F 67E0 E890 A0BB BDAE  EBB4 94A6 7A09 8ED5 7743
uid                            Admin <admin.bananasplit.info>

[ Post a follow-up to this message ]